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ABSTRACT
Color-blindness is a sociological term that refers to a state in which race is neither
“seen” nor relevant. That is, there is the assumption that all are equal, and race does not
matter. Adherents of the color-blind ideology contend that in order to improve race relations,
racial and ethnic differences should be ignored and, further, should not even be discussed. This
study investigated the following research questions: Does adherence to the color-blind
ideology differ by race? What is the relationship between racial self-awareness and opposition
to the color-blind ideology? Do geographic region, attitudes toward segregation, and political
ideology mediate the relationship between race and opposition to the color-blind ideology?
Using data from both waves of the Portraits of American Life Study this study observed the
changing attitudes to the color-blind ideology from Wave I in 2006 to Wave II in 2012, while
only including respondents who participated in both waves.
The current study found that racial identity mediated the relationship between race and
opposition to the color-blind ideology. Geographic region, political ideology and attitudes
toward legal segregation strengthened the relationship between race and opposition to the
color-blind ideology. There was a clear racial difference in response to the color-blind
ideology. Blacks and Hispanics were much more likely than whites to oppose the idea that one
of the most effective ways of dealing with race relations is to stop talking about race. This
suggests that contemporary American society is in no way “post-racial,” and that political and
social movements occurring between 2006 and 2012 have in no way erased the relevance of
race.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The color-blind ideology assumes that race no longer matters. Racism has been
eliminated or else minimized to the point that it no longer is an important or salient factor
in social structure, social life, and social relations today (Bonilla-Silva and Forman
2000). That is, there is the assumption that all are equal, and race does not matter.
Further, it is asserted that in order to improve race relations, racial and ethnic differences
should be ignored (Bonilla-Silva 2001). It is assumed that removing the idea of race
altogether will help create a more inclusive society, one in which a race-based
stratification no longer exists. Fundamentally, adherents of the color-blind ideology
contend that talking about race is actually the problem; racism is not the problem. It is
argued that ignoring and obliterating the idea of race altogether will make it possible to
create a more inclusive, fair and just society, and for some, a more civil and inclusive
world in which achievement trumps ascription. From this perspective, the world now is
“post-racial.” Previous findings have shown that the color-blind ideology exists and is
part of contemporary systemic racism, or what is characterized as the “new racism”
(Feagin and Vera 1995; Bonilla-Silva 2001).
The color-blind ideology supports the idea of a “level playing field” for all ethnic
groups. Others argue that the color-blind ideology also could be classified as racism
evasiveness (Beeman 2015), or an attempt to hide concealed racist beliefs (Bonilla-Silva
and Forman 2000; Hastie and Rimmington 2014). This is another feature of the “new” or
liberal racism that is more difficult to detect. The color-blind ideology, as a feature of this
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“new” form of racism, makes an assumption that structural racism does not exist, and that
white supremacy is really a function of cultural inferiority (or the deficiency) of blacks
(Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Bonilla-Silva 2001).
The general premise of the color-blind ideology is that racism is perpetuated by
discussions of race, and that by not discussing race it will no longer be real (Bonilla-Silva
and Forman 2000). Furthermore, this idea has been associated with equality despite its
potential for ignoring discrimination and structural inequality. This also can lead to
arguments regarding the racial inequality gap, or whether policy interventions such as
affirmative action are necessary. Those who believe that policy interventions based on
race are not necessary hold that racially based discrimination is not the cause of the
original inequalities; rather, the inequalities can be attributed to naturally occurring
phenomena (Bonilla-Silva 2012). This further complicates the racial discourse in the
United States due to different perceptions on the presence of systemic racism.
Racism in the United States continues to be a structural social problem. There are
some United States citizens who nonetheless hold that racism at the structural level no
longer is a social problem. To understand race relations in the United States, it is
important to understand the differences between blatant or traditional types of racism in
comparison to a newer subtler form of racism. Although traditional racism (e.g., refusing
to rent an apartment to someone on the basis of their race, Jim Crow Laws of the 1950’s)
may be more recognizable and overt, both of these forms of racism are real in their
consequences. Racial attitudes are still influential in predicting stances on public policy,
including the welfare state (Brown 2013). Analyzing white attitudes toward color-
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blindness and white privilege can also have public policy implications (Bunyasi 2015;
Hastie and Rimmington 2014). Whites who embrace white privilege and its implications
have generally been found to be more supportive of race-based policies aimed to help
ethnic minorities (Hastie and Rimmington 2014). Awareness of white privilege and the
structural dimensions of color-blind racism are therefore important in determining the
need for social policies intended to benefit ethnic minorities. New education programs
can be implemented to address the color-blind ideology within sociology, and its greater
impact on political processes.
The meaning and social significance of race in the United States has increased
within the past few decades, with a peak of interest after World War II (Winant 2000). It
also has increased globally. The Civil Rights movement, the Cold War, the anti-apartheid
in South Africa, the civil unrest in Ferguson, Missouri sparked by the shooting of
Michael Brown and Black Lives Matter (García and Sharif 2015) are a few examples of
social movements that have greatly influenced discussions about the social meaning of
race categories. Coinciding with these events are a number of migration patterns that
have shaped a new demographic in the United States (Rugh and Massey 2013). Race is
still a relevant topic for discussion in the twenty-first century, especially within the
discipline of sociology.
Sociologist Howard Winant (2001) posited that race is no longer characterized as
a natural, biological phenomenon, but instead is a social one. Race as a social construct
developed historically through propositions that differences in achievement among races
were due to biological differences (Saperstein, Penner and Light 2013). Race, although a
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social construction, has greatly affected the history and culture of the United States, and
continues to do so. We argue that, said another way, race is a social construction that has
taken on a life of its own and is inherent within social structures and personal and social
realities. That is, race is not merely a construct, it is a structure. Sociologists have
expanded greatly on the different dimensions of race as a social phenomenon through
racialization and the concept of a racialized culture. Using theories such as racial
formation theory and critical race theory, race is a fluid concept that is continually
modified by political and social forces (Winant 2000). Although race is a fluid concept, it
continues to remain a relevant one socially. From understanding racism and structural
inequality to more liberal forms of racism such as the color-blind ideology, it continues to
remain a relevant subject in the post-Civil Rights era. In terms of the future of the racial
landscape in the United States, Winant (2001) predicted that while there will be a greater
understanding of the relevance of racial identities; structural racism will continue to grow
alongside it. Winant (2015) later classified race and racism in the twenty-first century as
“dark-matter.” Race and racism were characterized this way to emphasize that the
relevance of race has largely been forgotten or ignored in institutional contexts.
There is a limited empirical analysis regarding correlates and mediators of
adherence to the color-blind ideology. While research has established that being white is
associated with adherence to the color-blind ideology (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000;
Levin et al. 2012), it is also the case that not all whites embrace this ideology. Whether
blacks embrace this ideology is not known at this time. Previous research has mainly
relied on examining color-blindness through qualitative and cross-sectional studies that
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rely on convenience samples, but these studies have failed to observe the changes in
attitudes toward color-blindness in a panel design. More information is needed regarding
the correlates and mediators of adherence to this ideology.
This thesis aimed to answer the following research questions: Does adherence to
the color-blind ideology differ by race? Does self-awareness of one’s race mediate the
relationship between race and opposition to the color-blind ideology? Can geographic
region, attitudes toward legal segregation and political ideology also mediate the
relationship between race and opposition to the color-blind ideology?
This study focused on addressing agreement with color-blindness between the
years 2006 and 2012, which has not been analyzed in depth through several studies
(Bonilla-Silva 1997, 2000; Zamudio and Rios 2006; Vargas 2014). It is important to
study and understand the color-blind ideology and its racist undertones to combat the idea
that the United States is a post-racial society. The idea of a post-racial society has many
negative and serious implications in the United States. President Barack Obama’s
election in 2008, along with the supposed “rise” of the black middle class, has helped
justify the notion that the United States is now post-racial. President Obama’s election in
2008 helped develop the “new” politics of race (Logan 2014), and contrary to what is
widely believed, further validated the color-blind ideology for many whites in the United
States (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011; Bonilla-Silva 2012:260). The 2008 election
stirred conversations over racial progress, along with the meaning and importance of
racial diversity in contemporary society. There is still an assumption that having an
African American president is a strong indicator of racial progress, however this cannot
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be the only indicator of progress when structural racism pervades into justice and public
health systems (García and Sharif 2015; Wingfield 2015). There is also evidence of a
large racial divide on median household income and educational attainment (Pew
Research 2016). The idea of this post-racial society ignores the reality of the racialized
society we inhabit, the relevance of race in everyday life, and the means by which race
remains relevant in political processes.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
The sociology of race and ethnicity is an understudied field compared to other
topics within sociology (Brunsma, Embrick, and Nanney 2015). It is important, therefore,
to conduct research on the color-blind ideology, not only to add to a lacking research
field but to address how racism is a salient part of an organized social structure. The
study of race within sociology is linked to global political processes (Winant 2000). It is
also critical to understanding growing social and economic inequalities (Brunsma et
al. 2015). The following literature review will address the rationalizations for maintaining
structural inequality, types and forms of racism, the theoretical background for the
current study, and previous empirical findings on color-blind racism.
Types and Forms of Racism
In addition to structural racism, racism can take on other different forms. There
are traditional forms of racism, which are considered more overt, and then there are
“new” or liberal forms of racism which are more subtle and difficult to detect (BonillaSilva 2001:89). The varying forms of racism include individual racism that is based on
prejudiced beliefs, institutionalized racism that is imbedded within social institutions,
structural racism, where inequality is based on exclusion in social institutions, and
systemic racism which is derived from policies and practices within social institutions
(Blum 2004). Systemic racism is, according to Elias and Feagin (2016:258), “a concrete
material and social reality, and thus is well embedded in all major institutions of society.”
Systemic racism is evident in attitudes toward the welfare state, in that color-blind
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stances are taken to ignore continued social and economic inequalities on the basis of
race (Bonilla-Silva 2012). This tendency to disregard race saturates into other political
processes (Brown 2013). Color-blindness is even evident in Supreme Court cases such as
Grutter v. Bollinger in 2003 (Walsh 2004) and more recently with Fisher v. the
University of Texas in 2016 (Liptak 2016; Thomason 2016). These Supreme Court cases
rested on the premise that race-conscious policies are beneficial in promoting a diverse
student body in university settings. It was posited that in order to accomplish this goal
color-blindness (to ignore potential inequality on the basis of race) must be removed from
the justice system. It also has been posited that the justice system is just as capable of
promoting post-racial stances and white domination (Moore 2014), despite any notions of
“equal protection” under the law. Although the traditional and overt forms of racism have
been denounced by many in the post-Civil Rights era (see, e.g., Zamudio and Rios 2006),
structural inequality persists for marginalized groups. Inequality affects opportunities and
quality of life. The persistence of inequality is perplexing and discordant with notions of
equality and progress, two traditional “American” values. However, as explained by Elias
and Feagin (2016:258), theorists often overlook or ignore the ways in which whites
societally reproduced “unbalanced racial power and privilege” through “an array of
intergenerational social inheritance mechanisms supported by most societal institutions.”
Contemporary (or “modern,” or symbolic) forms of racism posit that racial
minorities, typically blacks, are culturally or morally deficient (Winant 2001; BonillaSilva 2001; Picca and Feagin 2007). Arguing that blacks are culturally deficient implies
that they lack a worth ethic. This purportedly contemporary racism holds that blacks
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demand too much desegregation, and that they fail to take advantage of provided
resources that assist in upward mobility. Those who hold this view of a lack of individual
accountability fail to account for structural inequality that has been maintained even after
the Civil Rights era (Shams 2015). However, there is nothing new about the assumption
that blacks and other minorities are culturally and morally deficient. Racist assertions that
blacks lack a work ethic also are not new (see, e.g., DuBois 1898; Gilman 1908). Rather,
just as in the past these racist notions effectively skirt the fact that race-based
discrimination is operating. Consequences include lower pay and higher unemployment
among devalued minorities, as well as blocked access to the resources that would avail
them of the cultural capital typically associated with the majority group(s) in society.
Forms of exclusionary domination promote an ethnic stratification that promotes
unequal opportunities for members of a community solely based on ethnic background
(Esman 2004). It has been stated that the color-blind ideology is more prevalent among
the majority group due to a parallel belief in a meritocratic society (Tran and Peterson
2015), where, it is contended, that work ethic is the only determinant of sustained
success. In other words, it is contended that achievement, rather than ascription or other
social forces and factors, determine status. According to this assertion, race should be
ignored when observing individual differences. Instead, persons should be judged solely
by their individual work ethic.
In reality, upward mobility is constrained by factors such as racial discrimination
and types and degrees of status ascription. These factors mitigate any earned rewards
emanating solely from individuals’ work (Tumin 1985). Similar arguments are used to
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ignore the power of class ascription in contributing to the constraints on achievement that
are beyond the control of individuals. The dampening effect on the presumed power of
work ethic is further compounded by sex-based ascription. Sociologists posit that the
color-blind ideology is not recognized to be racist, or as an ideology furthering white
supremacy among its adherents (Feagin and Vera 1995; Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000;
Feagin 2001).
There are several views on the current racism discourse that help advance
adherence to the color-blind ideology in the United States. One view holds that traditional
racism (pre-Civil Rights era) is outdated - a “thing of the past,”- and that the Civil Rights
movement of the 1950s and 1960s has eradicated policies that previously limited ethnic
minorities (Zamudio and Rios 2006). Another view holds that government agencies such
as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have been put in place to ensure that
traditional racism is not as prevalent, and that upward mobility for ethnic minorities is
therefore attainable. This is closely related to a belief that an emerging black middle class
can thrive (Shams 2015). This perspective does not account for the persistence of a black
under-class, which has been around since Emancipation.
Maintaining Structural Inequality: White Privilege and Color-Blind Racism
According to Bonilla-Silva (2012:3-4), the racial order in the United States is
maintained by some (but not all) whites, who help sustain the racial hierarchy by
continuing participation in forms of laissez-faire discrimination (Bobo, Kluegel, and
Smith 1997). Bonilla-Silva (2012) also posited that whites ignore the structural
disadvantages that ethnic minorities face, and that white privilege is responsible for the
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maintenance of a white hegemony (Feagin 2001). Thus, subordinate races are caught in a
struggle to become a part of the status quo. For example, some whites oppose affirmative
action because it is seen as facilitating preferential treatment. This opposition to race
conscious policies then helps to justify the structural advantage of whites.
Hughey, Embrick, and Donne (2015) overviewed the processes that rationalize
structural inequality, mainly based on acts of racial discrimination. Drawing on earlier
structural interpretations of racism, they identified six determinants of what they defined
to be a racialized social system in the United States. The dimensions are as follows:
•

racism as a result and a characteristic of a racialized society

•

racism as variable, enough so that it is very difficult to determine any
improvement in the racial landscape over time

•

racism as a system that rationalizes existing systems of stratification

•

racism as more than an ideology

•

racism as blatant just as it can be subtle

This confirms previous research showing that systemic racism is sustained by
white privilege and a white racial frame (Bonilla-Silva 2001; Feagin 2006). Color-blind
racism is subtle and rationalizes existing systems of stratification. Bonilla-Silva (2012)
described the rationalization of this ideology from four different perspectives. BonillaSilva explained that the ideology manifests itself through 1) an inaccurate assumption of
equal opportunity, or “abstract liberalism” 2) justification by “naturalization,” 3) through
a cultural frame that justifies the system of stratification, and 4) the belief that sufficient
progress has been made in terms of racial inequality (Bonilla-Silva 2012:12).
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The last perspective of minimization states that the United States has made
significant progress in terms of racial inequality. While there still may be some evidence
of discrimination there are also many more opportunities that previously were not
available to ethnic minorities. The justification through naturalization holds that racial
inequality is a natural occurrence, and therefore “just the way things are.” These
perspectives, along with the color-blind ideology, provide further justification for
ignoring and further rationalizing racial discrimination (Hughey et al. 2015). The
naturalization of racial inequality also helps validate color-blind behavior while
maintaining an inequitable stratified system.
It is important to note that racism is mainly a structural phenomenon (BonillaSilva 1997), and trying to interpret racism through a social psychological lens at the
individual level presents a limited perspective of the issue. With this in mind, the
evidence for a racialized society cannot be determined by individual behavior alone.
Rather, a structural approach can provide reasons for examining racism that exists at the
institutional level (Bonilla-Silva 1997). An individual level approach can easily ignore
this interpretation by only focusing on the racist beliefs of individuals alone. However,
some social psychological research has been conducted on color-blind racism (Awad et
al. 2005; Apfelbaum 2008; Levin et al. 2013). The study of prejudice is itself highly
popular in psychological studies, but these studies fail to account for the “material”
aspect of racism (Bonilla-Silva 2015). This material aspect is linked to group domination
and systemic, policy-based racism.
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Theoretical Background
Omi and Winant’s (1986) racial formation theory provided a way of examining
racism through a sociological perspective, one in which race is considered a socially
constructed identity. Racial formation theory is used to understand race as a social
construction, and then explains racism and how it operates. Racial formation theory
emphasizes a general classification of the “other” group, which is then used to justify
various structures of inequality and differential treatment (Omi and Winant 1986:105).
Over time, different perspectives on racial formation theory have developed through
different modes of analysis. Racial formation theory is applied to macro-, micro-, and
meso-level sociological research (Saperstein et al. 2013). Macro-level studies generally
focus on distinct racial categories, while micro-level studies analyze the individuals who
are assigned to these categories. Outside of this, meso-level studies analyze the
intertwining of institutional contexts (Saperstein et al. 2013).
In the past, social inequalities were attributed to genetic or biological differences.
Omi and Winant’s (1986) idea of a social construction of race challenged this notion.
Winant (2000) later posited that political processes, such as decolonization and the Civil
Rights movement, helped shape the sociological construction of race over time. Although
racial formation theory offers a reference for understanding race through a sociological
lens, Winant (2000) proposed a new, more elaborate race theory that accounts for the
historical sociology of race. Winant argued that racial formation theory, although not
perfect in its approach, provides a sociological understanding of race while accounting
for large-scale political processes. Race as a social construct is endemic in racialized
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societies (Omi and Winant 1986; Winant 2000). Omi and Winant have posited that a
social structure based on racial hierarchies always has been in place (1986:137), and that
race has been salient in North America since the earliest European conquests.
Racial formation theory also is evident in Feagin’s (2006) theory of systemic
racism. Feagin (2006) argued that the persistence of systemic racism is due to the
presence of a white racial frame. The white racial frame is “an organized set of racialized
ideas, stereotypes, emotions, and inclinations to discriminate” (Feagin 2006: 24).
According to Feagin (2006), white racial framing helps justify and rationalize a social
system in which systemic racism is imbedded. The white racial frame long has been
imbedded in American society, even starting with some of the first presidents of the
United States. The rationalization of the white racial frame has persisted through time,
and has repeatedly justified white superiority and privilege (Picca and Feagin 2007:28).
This perspective, along with racial formation theory, contradicts the commonly held postracial view of contemporary American society.
Color-Blindness in the context of Social Policy and the Welfare State
Williams’ (2003) analysis of social policy and race based on critical race theory
and a policy legal approach uncovered the relevance of race in determining social
policies throughout the history of the United States. Williams first explained the shaping
of social policy by race through liberal individualism (2003:6). Liberal individualism
parallels the assumptions of a meritocratic society in which work ethic and reasonable
decision-making are necessary to succeed. Liberal individualism emphasizes individual
responsibility, hard work, and abundant economic opportunity.
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Williams (2003) posited that the welfare state in the United States was delayed
mostly in part to a belief in liberal individualism. Williams (2003) provided a historical
analysis that demonstrated that throughout the history of the United States, African
Americans have been denied the opportunities that individual liberalism promotes,
although both whites and blacks have been shown to embrace aspects of abstract
liberalism (Manning, Hartmann, and Gerteis 2015). African Americans also have been
denied opportunities due to biological arguments supposedly rooted in genetics,
suggesting that race is genetically inherited (Law 2010; Byrd and Hughey 2015; Byrd
and Ray 2015; Gillborn 2016). These biological arguments have been taken as fact
regarding predetermined abilities, and race science became an emerging field through
efforts such as the Human Genome Project and the International HapMap project (Law
2010; Phelan, Link and Feldman 2013; Byrd and Hughey 2015; Byrd and Ray 2015).
These studies are problematic due to their persistence in presenting race differences as
scientific fact, and they have the capacity to affect current conceptions of race (Phelan et
al. 2013), along with public policy initiatives (Gillborn 2016). Discussions of biological
determinism and genetic influences on race are still relevant in the social sciences today
(Morning 2014).
Williams’ (2003) historical analysis revealed how social policies were constructed
in response (or as a non-response) to the inequity in opportunity. Williams (2003:19)
asserted that a historical analysis of the development of social policies over time could be
beneficial in observing progress as well as struggle. Critical race theorists contend that
the white hegemony is not maintained by blatant individual racism; rather, it is mostly
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maintained by institutional factors (Williams 2003:12). This idea contradicts the notion
that social policies have mainly benefited ethnic minorities instead of whites. Staples’
(1995) analysis of responses to public policies such as affirmative action confirmed a
false perception (held by whites) of a strong black middle class. This false perception
affected the opinions toward the need for policies such as affirmative action; whites
believed that the programs were unnecessary due to another assumption based on a postracial society. John F. Kennedy introduced affirmative action policies into the United
States to see increases in the numbers of jobs in the public sector for African Americans
and other ethnic minorities (Staples 1995). Although it is generally held that African
Americans are the only beneficiaries of the policy, the policy was intended to benefit
women, Asians, Hispanics, military veterans and the disabled.
The most frequently posited arguments against policies such as affirmative action
are that the progress from the 1960’s has been enough to level the playing field for all
minorities. This argument fails to take account for the racial composition of the United
States. Although white males composed around 35 percent of United States citizens in
1999, they generally held 75 percent of the highest earnings in the country (Staples
1995). As of 2015, there are still noticeable race income gaps in the United States, even
when controlling for educational attainment. In regards to median hourly earnings, blacks
earned 75% as much as whites (Patten 2016). White males averaged $21 hourly
compared to blacks ($15 hourly) and Hispanics ($14 hourly). Hourly earnings were also
higher for white ($18 hourly) and Asian women ($17 hourly) compared to black ($13
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hourly) and Hispanic ($12 hourly) women. White males also made up 33% of the
workforce in 2015, composing the largest demographic group (Patten 2016).
Assuming a strong black middle class, granting ethnic minorities a few amount of
rights can even strengthen majority group domination (Esman 2004). Esman’s
(2004:173-177) analysis of ethnic dominance used Northern Ireland as an example of a
political democracy that maintained a government dominated by a Protestant majority.
Roman Catholics, the minority group, were controlled and suppressed by the Protestant
majority even in a system supposedly based on freedom and democracy. Esman (2004)
argued that ethnic minorities still could be controlled by the granting of a small amount
of rights, which then confine the minorities into their status as those with less power.
In extreme cases, minorities may not be granted any rights, and could later be labeled as
the main opposition to the majority (Esman 2004:176). If anything, this suggests that
even in a political system allegedly based on freedom of speech and choice, minority
groups can still be severely disadvantaged.
Contact Theory, Religious Affiliation, and Segregation among Communities
Different theories have been constructed to understand the dynamics and effects
of interracial contact at the individual level. Of particular importance has been how
interracial contact affects social ties among different races. Emerson, Kimbro, and
Yancey (2002) analyzed contact theory as an explanation for interracial social
interactions at the individual level. Contact theory states that by increasing contact
between different racial groups, positive interracial relations will also increase, and
prejudice among groups will also decrease (Allport 1954). The means by which this
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process occurs generally results from four different changes: 1) shared goals, 2)
intergroup cooperation, 3) authoritative support and 4) a balanced social status (Emerson
et al. 2002).
Emerson et al. (2002) analyzed interracial social ties, and the advantages for those
involved. The authors asserted that these social ties are particularly beneficial for
reducing segregation among individuals, and that if these ties are developed early, they
are likely to be sustained into adulthood. The authors used retrospective data from the
Lilly Survey of Attitudes and Social Networks, which included a nationally
representative sample of 2,561 American citizens. In their test of the contact hypothesis,
Emerson et al. (2002) hypothesized that previous racial contact would lead to noticeable
changes in the racial diversity of social circles. It was found that participants who, as
children, had interracial contact experiences at the neighborhood and school level were
more likely to have racially diverse social groups as adults (Emerson et al. 2002:745).
The authors first measured the racial makeup of an individual’s social circle (i.e.
people with whom they regularly had contact), along with the respondent’s social ties
(i.e. all of the people with whom they frequently contact) (Emerson et al. 2002). Ranges
for these values were measured on a scale from 1-5 with (1=all of the same race) and
(5=none of the same race). The third measure of general social ties analyzed the
respondents who regularly attended a religious congregation (two or more times a
month). The last measure asked about interracial marriages.
The study revealed that previous residence in racially mixed neighborhoods and
racially mixed schools influenced the racial makeup of a respondent’s current circle of
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friends. It was found that on average, whites had less diverse friend groups compared to
blacks. The respondent’s age, being an immigrant and being married, and living in a
central city all reduced the diversity of one’s social circle. However, living in a central
city had the opposite effect for whites (Emerson et al. 2002). Overall, the study
contributed to the literature on contact theory by analyzing previous interracial behavior
as a predictor for current diversity, or lack thereof, within one’s social circle.
Although contact with other races is generally seen as a factor that reduces
prejudice (Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, and Christ 2011), it does not always reduce
prejudice. There are still a number of limitations related to contact theory, such that it is
not always seen as a nonracist strategy. Although contact with other races is usually
associated with a greater understanding of “other” ethnic groups to diminish stereotypes
(Pettigrew et al. 2011), these stereotypes can just as easily be re-learned (Erasmus 2010).
Other limitations of contact theory are its assumptions that race is stable, and therefore
contact theory can be a more “reformist” strategy instead of a transformative strategy
(Erasmus 2010).
Religious affiliation also has been shown to be an important variable when
assessing diversity among closed communities (Porter and Emerson 2013). Most
religious communities have been characterized as tight-knit, with strong social ties. These
groups have been shown to have very rigid ideologies, with an aversion to outside
influence (Porter and Emerson 2013). Closed communities such as these also vary
depending on geographic space. That is, the Midwest may have a higher percentage of
Protestants compared to the Northeast, which may have a higher percentage of Roman
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Catholics. There are also variations of these beliefs with religious ideologies differing
between conservative and liberal views. The South itself is very distinct from other parts
of the country due to low levels of educational attainment, a higher percentage of
African-American residents (Porter and Emerson 2013), and generally more conservative
views. As a whole, more rural regions of the country tend to be more religious, and are
thus more clustered or segregated into distinct communities (Porter and Emerson 2013).
The homogeneity of environments, from the neighborhood level to the school
level, often goes unnoticed through the lens of color-blind racism. If areas are segregated,
it is simply by choice, and not due to any other social forces. Along with racism as a
whole, this ideology assumes that legal segregation in school environments has been
done away with by the Supreme Court case Brown vs. The Board of Education of Topeka
in 1954. The segregation seen today is generally expected to be from natural social
forces, while race is left as an explanation that would have only been expected during the
pre-Civil Rights era.
Geographic Region, Legal Segregation, and Integration
In terms of the geographic racial landscape, some perspectives hold that whites
are separated from ethnic minorities, both intentionally and unintentionally, and this
prevents them from understanding how race matters for ethnic minorities in everyday
life. This can apply to neighborhoods, schools (Cabrera 2014; Modica 2015), workplaces
and churches, all of which maintain some degree of racial segregation (Lewis 2001; Pew
Research Center 2008b). Therefore, if whites generally remain in homogeneous
environments with other whites (Rugh and Massey 2013), the odds of adhering to the
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color-blind ideology, which ignores racial differences, are higher. In terms of geographic
space, the color-blind ideology would assume that neighborhoods and schools, if
segregated, are segregated by choice and not by other structural factors. This again
reinforces the naturalization assumption.
In general, ethnic minorities typically oppose the color-blind ideology in favor of
multiculturalism, while whites typically favor acculturation, or cultural change that
occurs when differing cultures meet, and ideas or notions similar to the color-blind
ideology (Ryan et al. 2007; Neville et al. 2013). Acculturation has been classified as a
form of inclusionary discrimination (Esman 2004). Acculturation can be forced, in that in
order to advance within a society, the minority members must learn majority practices
(e.g. language, customs). In the context of the color-blind ideology, acculturation can
force majority group practices on minority groups so that all of the practices within a
broader community are almost identical (color-blind). Therefore, individuals are seen just
as individuals, regardless of clear race differences. For multiculturalism, cultural
differences are acknowledged and then promoted under one area of authority. In this way,
multiculturalism differs from the color-blind ideology which ignores race entirely.
Although some ethnic minorities may try to balance both their own practices and those of
the majority, it is more likely that the minority group’s distinctive and defining cultural
markers will diminish because of the pressure of adapting to majority group practices in
everyday life.
Acculturation is widely believed to be a hierarchy enhancing behavior, due to its
reliance on blending minority ethnic group characteristics with majority ethnic group
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practices and characteristics (Taylor and Moghaddam 1987). Within the United States,
this has involved the abandonment of ethnic-minority group practices in place of majority
ethnic group practices. This is an assimilation process that helps reinforce an “American
identity” for some members of minority ethnic groups’ name (1987). Forced assimilation
also has been very prevalent throughout the history of the United States. Multiculturalism
is considered a hierarchy-attenuating behavior due to its reliance on accepting and or
incorporating ethnic minority group practices (Levin et al. 2012). In this way,
multiculturalism is the opposite of assimilation, which mainly relies on minority groups
adopting majority group practices. The color-blind ideology is considered by some to be
a hierarchy attenuating behavior (due to the assumption of a “level” playing field).
The support for multiculturalism among blacks can be contributed to a number of
factors. One of the main contributors is being reared in homes where people regularly
recognize their own ethnic diversity (Brewer 1993; Phinney 1992). Reminders of their
ethnic identity throughout childhood serve to highlight the ethnic differences amongst
other ethnic groups within the United States as well. This distinction could potentially
contribute to a stance on the color-blind ideology, which ignores racial differences
altogether. Racial self-awareness also has been linked to the salience of one’s racial
identity and sense of self (Winkler 2012:2). Some African American parents, along with
parents of other ethnic minorities, rear their children to develop a sense of pride in their
race and ethnic background. In this environment, a young member of an ethnic minority
would likely be more self-aware of their own race.
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Portés and Zhou (1993) argued that acculturation is very uneven and segmented,
with several possible outcomes for second-generation immigrants. The outcomes of
acculturation are mainly due to the availability of resources and vulnerability. Immigrants
face other obstacles that limit upward mobility in employment and education, and this
may serve as a further impediment to acculturation. Race specifically can strengthen
these boundaries, especially for immigrant children that are growing into acculturation
(Portés and Zhou 1993). Immigrant children are also a rapidly increasing population;
these boundaries present problems for their future (Haller, Portés, and Lynch 2011).
Without a smooth transition into the majority group, second-generation immigrant
children may reject this notion altogether and engage in deviant behaviors.
Ethnic minorities are often reminded of their ethnicity when they are confronted
by acts of ethnic discrimination (Phinney 1992). This discrimination could manifest itself
through acts of traditional racism, or acts of more discrete racism (Zamudio and Rios
2006). Discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is a reminder of one’s membership in a
particular ethnicity (Apfelbaum et al. 2008). Although one’s ethnicity can contribute to
support or opposition to the color-blind ideology, self-awareness is also a relevant factor.
Sellers et al. (1998) proposed four ideologies that African Americans hold in relation to
their racial self-awareness. The four ideologies are a nationalist identity (a general sense
of pride), an oppressed minority ideology, an assimilationist ideology (the perceived need
to blend in with the ethnic majority), and a humanist ideology. Combined, these
ideologies influence individual behavior and individual perceptions on race-based issues
(Sellers et al. 1998)
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Empirical Findings
Segregation patterns have persisted in the United States, despite any inclination
that American citizens prefer diverse communities (Pew Research Center 2008b). This
does not hold true for all corners of the United States; however, patterns of segregation
are still re-emerging. Rugh and Massey (2013) used data from the Decennial Census of
Housing and Population by the decade starting from 1970 and ending in 2010. This
allowed for a comparison of how communities have or have not been isolated over the
past 40 years. Using a panel of 287 metropolitan statistical areas, the study controlled for
socioeconomic status, industrial organization, urbanism and geographic region.
The Rugh and Massey (2013) study was conducted on the heels of a sharp
increase in the growth of the Hispanic population (from 8-45 million) across the span of
40 years in the observed metropolitan areas. The black population also showed a gradual
increase over time (17.4-34.2 million), along with the Asian populations (1.5-16 million).
Using an index for analyzing trends in dissimilarity among neighborhoods, the authors
also found that the segregation between white and black communities has slowly declined
since the 1970s. However, it would take sixty-seven years in order to reach a point of low
dissimilarity. In contrast, the dissimilarity index increased for both Hispanic and Asian
populations, indicating that these communities have become less segregated. Overall, the
authors found that although racial segregation may be increasing in some metropolitan
areas, it might be on the decline in other non-metropolitan areas. The areas that are
integrating are areas with generally high levels of education and low levels of anti-Black
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or anti-Latino sentiments. The long-term findings on whether these communities will
become more or less segregated remain to be seen (Rugh and Massey 2013).
Lewis (2001) conducted an ethnographic study to examine segregation within
schools. Contrary to most studies on segregation within school environments that focus
on ethnic minorities, the study was conducted on an elementary school populated
primarily of white students. The analysis focused on the racial messages given from the
parents to the students, and how these messages reflected a hidden curriculum about race.
By examining this curriculum of learned and taught racial lessons, the explanation for
racial boundaries in the community would become evident. This “hidden” curriculum
also was important to understand how the participants arrived at the conclusion that race
no longer matters (Lewis 2001).
The Lewis (2001) study found that a multicultural education was not deemed
necessary by the school administration due to a largely white student population. The
study also revealed that students were taught to embrace color-blindness, and that
discussing race or acknowledging the presence of race was considered divisive. Again,
the adoption of color-blindness in these instances is strategic in that it emphasizes that
“we are all just people,” while ignoring the persisting salience of race and racism in
school and broader community settings. Color-blind stances are dangerous in classroom
settings because they avoid any real discussion of race or racial inequality. A call for
educational programs aimed toward discussing race openly in the classroom have
therefore been deemed necessary and important in the developing modern classroom
(Modica 2015).
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Similar trends in educational settings have been found, even in mixed-race
classrooms. The Modica (2015) field research study revealed that discussing race in the
classroom was generally avoided by teachers and students. This is mainly due to the fear
of being labeled a racist. This same pattern was found among white high school students,
who expressed anxiety and concern over being labeled a racist. Similar to previous
studies on white students (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000), the students from this
suburban high school also exhibited anxiety over using racially descriptive terms. The
perpetuation of the color-blind ideology in educational settings is not limited to K-12
systems. It is also present in post-secondary institutions as well. Cabrera (2014)
conducted interviews with 12 white college students at a Western University in the
United States. It was found that the 12 white students found little evidence of racism on
the campus. In fact, the white students embraced the notion that they were the victims of
“reverse racism” on campus (Cabrera 2014). The white students blamed minority
students for promoting racial antagonism. This is one instance of how white individuals
can remain color-blind, or ignore the continuing significance of race in contemporary
society. The university environment is important for networking and serves as an
opportunity for increased earning potential after degrees are completed. If minorities are
underrepresented in these environments, the potential for job opportunities and future
success could be impeded. By ignoring this, white college students can further rationalize
the segregation found in university environments.
Although color-blind racism assumes that overt racism is a thing of the past, Picca
and Feagin (2007) analyzed various dimensions of racial events through journals kept by
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white college students across the United States. More specifically, they observed
observed racialized actions, the performers and observers of these actions, the racial
framing of these actions (through ideas, stereotypes, etc.), and the societal context of
these actions. While white college students are not a representative sample of all United
States citizens, Picca and Feagin (2007) chose to analyze the opinions of college students
based on the premise that these students could be potential authority figures of the future.
Another justification for a college student sample was that college students are typically
viewed as more tolerant in comparison to working class whites who are perceived as
more extreme in their racist views (2007:31).
Picca and Feagin’s (2007) analysis used Erving Goffman’s dramaturgy to
analyze front stage and back stage social interactions with whites and persons of other
races. University students recorded these social interactions into their journals. The
journals were later analyzed to examine the difference between front and back stage
behavior. The front stage was described as when the students were in public, while the
back stage was primarily when they were alone or among close friends. Picca and Feagin
(2007) found that in front stage interactions, the students were likely to avoid discussions
of race, other people of race, and repressed certain comments that might be deemed racist
by others. The front stage and back stage analysis is important in the context of colorblind racism because it reinforces the idea that racism is still relevant. White students that
claimed not to notice race (to be color-blind) in the front stage were depicted as overtly
racist in the backstage. This is where there are race differences in the assessment of the
color-blind ideology, and whether it is an effective way to address race-relations.
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Whether overt or covert, it is difficult to thoroughly analyze the back stage behavior to
see how this plays out realistically in the front stage. The back stage interactions,
typically occurring among whites, gave insight into what comments are made in an area
that is perceived as free from judgment for whites.
Zamudio and Rios (2006) further elaborated on the analysis from these journals
by analyzing the journals of 60 white students enrolled in Social Problems courses at the
University of Wyoming. They further categorized examples from entries by different
forms of racism, including traditional (overt), segregationist, revisionist racist narratives
(redefining racist actions to appear non-racist), and equal opportunity racism. Although
similar to Picca and Feagin’s analysis (2007), Zamudio and Rios (2006) distinguished
further the specific types of racism that were seen along with how they align with colorblind or traditional racism.
Other scholars also have measured the color-blind ideology with a sample of
college students. Bonilla-Silva and Forman (2000) analyzed qualitative and quantitative
data on white prejudiced attitudes among white college students in the United States. The
study relied on data from the 1997 Social Attitudes of College Students Survey that
included a sample of undergraduate students from four universities. A total of 732
students completed the survey. However, the analysis focused solely on the 451 white
students who had participated in the survey. These students were later asked to provide
their contact information. The 41 students who did provide contact information were
asked to return for in-depth interviews with other white graduate students.
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Bonilla-Silva and Forman’s 2000 study found a contradiction between responses
indicated on a survey and responses given during in-depth interviews. During the indepth interviews, “semantic moves” were used to avoid appearing prejudiced, although
their responses generally did reveal some support to affirmative action and assistance
toward ethnic minorities. This differed from the survey responses that were generally not
supportive of such assistance. This same pattern was found for questions on inter-racial
marriage and the significance of discrimination on blacks’ life chances. Overall, the
analysis indicated that survey questions are not necessarily more effective for measuring
prejudiced attitudes compared to in-depth interviews. In many cases, the responses
suggested a maintenance of the status quo, but this was not true for the students labeled
as progressives that were aware of white privilege.
Jackson, Sweeney and Welcher (2014) conducted an analysis using a sample of
72 undergraduate college students to analyze color-blindness and cross-racial interaction.
The study implemented 14 focus groups that were divided homogeneously by race. The
moderators of the focus groups were all female. However, it was not possible to match
the moderators by the same race of each focus group. The responses during the focus
group sessions involved three central themes that helped rationalize segregation among
the student body. The first theme was that although the students recognized the
segregation among the student population, this was described to be a natural
phenomenon. The students were also more likely to blame the underrepresented groups
for this segregation, stating that the creation of sub-groups based on race or ethnicity is
divisive (Jackson et al. 2014). This specific theme was consistent in all of the focus
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groups regardless of race or ethnic group. Another theme was a concern with a sense of
belonging to groups of other ethnicities. It was concluded that this may be due to an
original lack of cross-ethnic interaction, or the students may not intermix among groups
of other ethnicities due to peer pressure.
Awad, Cokley, and Ravitch (2005) also examined color-blind attitudes and
attitudes toward affirmative action through a sample of college students. The sample of
375 was a convenience sample from a Midwestern university in introductory and
advanced level psychology courses. The study examined why Whites generally oppose
affirmative action, even if whites acknowledge that affirmative action exists to increase
equality. It was argued that sex and race would contribute to a large amount of variation
on attitudes toward affirmative action; however, color-blind related attitudes were
hypothesized to contribute an even larger variation. Race was found to be a significant
predictor of attitudes toward affirmative action, while sex was not. It also was found that
color-blind and modern racist attitudes were significantly associated with attitudes toward
affirmative action. The third hypothesis, which stated that color-blind attitudes would be
a stronger predictor of attitudes toward affirmative action compared to modern racist
attitudes, also was supported (see also: Ravitch 2002).
Hastie and Rimmington (2014) found, consistent with the color-blind ideology,
recurring comments that denied the existence of structural inequality based on race, as
well as comments suggesting that the mention of race is itself racist. The mention of
white privilege was not frequent among the comments, however, those who did
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acknowledge white privilege used it as a mechanism to explain the persistence of
structural inequality.
The findings from Bunyasi’s (2015) study supported previous research on white
privilege and color-blindness, in that a self-recognition of white privilege and its
advantages can be important in understanding the persistence of structural inequality.
Therefore, those who are color-blind are likely not aware of white privilege (Bunyasi
2015), although the authors could not determine the race of the commentators on the
articles. The persistence of white privilege was referenced using the phrase ‘200 years of
white affirmative action,’ (Hastie and Rimmington 2014), suggesting that cultural
restitution is in order to account for the advantages whites have had and continue to have.
Hastie and Rimmington (2014) observed the connection between recognition of
racial privilege and support toward social policies aimed to reduce inequality. The
authors analyzed awareness of one’s privilege as a means for supporting these social
policies. Relying on data from 357 discussion board comments (331 being original
comments, 26 comments being re-posts from the same user) regarding six New York
Times articles that were made in response to Supreme Court rulings of discrimination
against European American firefighters, along with one Hispanic firefighter. The authors
used the articles relating to this case due to the potential for comments exhibiting white
privilege. The majority of these comments focused on either the Supreme Court cases
themselves, or else on broader subjects such as affirmative action (Hastie and
Rimmington 2014).
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Bunyasi (2015) tested hypotheses relating to white racial identities, white
privilege and attitudes toward race-specific policies. The analysis used data from five
global telephone interviews conducted from 2000 and 2009. The interviews asked
questions about a variety of current political issues, with a focus on racial issues. The
survey items were related to an acceptance or denial of white privilege, both for the
individual and within society as a whole. For the main dependent variables, the first
policy-based survey item asked about support or opposition to programs that make efforts
to help minorities advance to make up for past discrimination. Other survey items asked
about the necessity of diverse workspaces and the presences of laws that protect
minorities from discrimination in the hiring process (Bunyasi 2015).
In the Bunyasi (2015) study, the independent variables were attitudes toward
white privilege in the workplace and a general measure assessing whether upward
mobility is easier for whites. It was found that an acceptance of white privilege was
associated with support for race-based policy initiatives, but it also was found that both
privilege affirming whites and color-blind whites were more supportive of affirmative
action as a means of reconciling for past discrimination. Disadvantaged whites, however,
were much less likely to report support for affirmative action programs. Color-blind
whites were found to be less likely to support diversity in the workplace. When assessing
the entire sample, the majority of the white respondents did not acknowledge white
privilege. Disadvantaged whites were found to be significantly different from color-blind
and privilege acknowledging whites in all cases. This is one of the few studies that used
disadvantaged whites as a category, instead of focusing on the dichotomy between color-
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blind and non-colorblind whites. It also was suggested that the expressed color-blind
views might have been adopted in an attempt to express socially acceptable views
(Bunyasi 2015). These findings coincide with previous research suggesting that survey
results might contradict responses given during in-depth interviews (Bonilla-Silva and
Forman 2000).
Wilkins and Wenger (2014) conducted an analysis using data from the General
Social Survey to uncover the relationship between a belief in a just world and attitudes
toward affirmative action for women and African Americans. As hypothesized, the
authors found that those who believe in a just world, where equal opportunity is abundant
for all citizens, oppose government intervention in the form of social programs (2014).
When controlling for political ideology, it was found that conservatives were much more
likely to oppose affirmative action compared to those who identified as extremely liberal
(Wilkins and Wenger 2014). The evaluation of the deserving and the un-deserving is
relevant to the color-blind ideology in a number of ways. First, the color-blind ideology
assumes a meritocratic society in which a strong work ethic is all that is necessary to
achieve upward mobility. The meritocratic assumption, along with other “liberal”
principles are also apparent in other countries (Augoustinos, Tuffin and Every 2005), and
are used as a justification for opposing policies such as affirmative action. Through the
lens of color-blindness, programs such as affirmative action are rendered unnecessary due
to a belief that there should be “equal opportunity” for all. It is also important to examine
political ideology in these cases because it can help shape individual attitudes and beliefs
regarding how society functions.
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McDermott (2015) analyzed American Community Survey data on the salience of
white racial identities in the contemporary color-blind era. McDermott (2015) posited
that color-blind ideology adherence for whites generally stems from the idea of selfreliance and a strong sense of national identity, the latter suggesting that national identity
goes beyond racial and ethnic distinctions. Therefore, the construction of a white identity
varies. McDermott (2015) asserted that whites who acknowledge the relevance of racism
are more likely to have a stronger white identity, but whites who believe that race is
irrelevant are much less likely to have any awareness of their racial identity. Whites are
often distinguished as the default category when examining race, and “white” is the
commonly used default category to which all other races are compared. There are a
number of empirical studies that have covered color-blind racism, segregation, attitudes
toward affirmative action, and white privilege. All of these topics relate to contemporary
racism in that although there is evidence that race continues to be a salient factor in social
life and life opportunities, race continues to be ignored.
The majority of studies on color-blind racism, however, have focused on
convenience samples of white college students. These results are not generalizable and
lack the benefits of a nationally representative survey. This study aimed to address these
limitations with a panel study that did include a nationally representative sample. This
study also aimed to analyze the potential mediating factors of geographic region, political
ideology, racial identity and attitudes toward legal segregation, something that has not
been analyzed in previous work. McDermott’s (2015) study mainly aimed to address the
mediators of adherence to the color-blind ideology through race among other control
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variables. For a more detailed comparison of previous empirical work on color-blind
racism, reference Table 1.
____________________
Refer to Table 1, page 83
____________________
Summary of Literature Review
This literature review examined the different forms of racial discrimination, the
social and structural rationalizations for adherence to the color-blind ideology, and the
importance of racial awareness in relation to the color-blind ideology. This review
focused on the false perception of a post-racial society and why contemporary colorblindness ignores structural inequality that continues to persist in a racialized society.
Although it is a social construct, race continues to be a relevant factor in public policy,
political processes and social life. The color-blind ideology, as part of contemporary
racism, persists due to an insistence that race is no longer relevant and that discussing
race itself is racist. This limits discussions on programs that aim to benefit ethnic
minorities who are disadvantaged in a racialized society that has continued to maintain
the status quo of a white hegemony.
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CHAPTER THREE
HYPOTHESES
This study aimed to test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Black respondents and respondents of other races will be more
likely than White respondents to disagree with the color-blind ideology.
Whites generally have been shown to agree with the color-blind ideology (Bonilla-Silva
and Forman 2000; Levin 2001; Levin et al. 2012; McDermott 2015), due to its potential
for sustaining systemic racism. Black respondents and respondents of other races were
therefore predicted to disagree with this ideology more so than white respondents.
Blacks, Hispanics, and respondents of other races were also predicted to disagree with the
color-blind ideology due to the racial divide on attitudes toward policies such as
affirmative action. There is continued evidence of a racial divide on race-based issues in
the United States (Bobo 2011; Pew Research Center 2016), particularly among whites,
blacks, and Hispanics. Whites stand to benefit from being color-blind, in that a general
disregard of racial differences is associated with a disregard for the persistence of social
and economic discrimination faced by blacks and Hispanics. This also enables whites to
continue to benefit from a privileged status as the dominant group.
Hypothesis 2: Geographic region will mediate the relationship between race and
opposition to the color-blind ideology.
Through the contact hypothesis, whites tend to be segregated geographically when
compared to other races (Emerson et al. 2002). It is also true that the relevance of race
can be ignored depending on one’s environment and upbringing (Brewer 1993).
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Geographic region was predicted to mediate the relationship between race and the colorblind ideology, and it also was intended to be a proxy for neighborhood level
communities. Individuals who live in highly segregated areas might not “see” the
relevance of race in everyday life, nor will they see the need for race-conscious social
policies.
Hypothesis 3: Political ideology will mediate the relationship between race and
opposition to the color-blind ideology.
Attitudes toward social policies that benefit racial minorities are closely correlated with
political ideology, and thus indirectly associated with adherence to the color-blind
ideology. Basic ideas and principles based on racial progress can be closely related to
political ideology. More progressive ideologies might lean towards more social change,
while more conservative ideologies might lean towards preserving the status quo
(Bonilla-Silva 2012; Pew Research Center 2016). Conservatives are generally more
likely to oppose affirmative action and other social policies intended to benefit ethnic
minorities compared to those who identify as liberal (Wilkins and Wenger 2014).
Hypothesis 4: Self-awareness of one’s race will mediate the relationship
between race and opposition to the color-blind ideology.
The self-awareness of one’s race was predicted to provide a rationale for disagreeing with
the color-blind ideology, which ignores the relevance of race in everyday life.
Respondents who are more aware of their racial identity were predicted to be more
opposed to the color-blind ideology compared to those who are not frequently aware of
their racial identity, due to a higher potential for discriminatory encounters, which serve
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as reminders of one’s racial identity (Sellers 1998; Sellers and Shelton 2003; Apfelbaum
2008).
Hypothesis 5: Attitudes toward legal segregation will mediate the relationship
between race and opposition to the color-blind ideology.
Along with geographic region, attitudes toward legal segregation are related to the divide
among different communities on the basis of race. Although legal segregation, along with
racism, is considered a phenomenon that has been done away with by the Civil Rights era
(Bonilla-Silva 2001), areas are continually segregated geographically by race (Rugh and
Massey 2013). In regards to geographic space, the color-blind ideology would assume
that neighborhoods and schools, if segregated, are segregated by choice and not by other
structural factors.
Figure 1 displayed in Appendix A is a graphic depiction of the anticipated
mediators of the relationship between race and the color-blind ideology. These variables
were selected as mediators of the relationship between race and the color-blind ideology
for a number of different reasons. Respondent’s race could influence where they are
located geographically, as communities generally tend to be segregated by race (Rugh
and Massey 2013). Attitudes toward legal segregation are also related to race, in that a
denial or acceptance of racial segregation within one’s community could vary greatly
depending on the perceived reasons for such segregation. The principles behind
respondent’s political ideology could also influence their attitudes toward colorblindness, in that political ideology can indicate how people believe society should work,
racial minorities have also been shown to be more liberal compared to whites (Pew
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Research Center 2016). Racial identity is related to the awareness of one’s race (Sellers et
al. 1998). This variable was chosen in the model to see if racial identity could influence
opinions on color-blindness, which presumes that race and racism have been erased.
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CHAPTER FOUR
METHODS
Data
The Portraits of American Life Study (formerly known as the Panel Study on
American Religion and Ethnicity) is a nationally representative multi-level panel study. It
included six hundred variables in the first wave in 2006 and eight hundred and sixty-one
variables in 2012, covering topics on religion, family relations, and deviance with an
emphasis on ethnic and racial diversity (Emerson and Sikkink 2006, 2012). The target
population for the study was non-institutionalized United States citizens who were
eighteen years or older by the time of the first wave. RTI international Inc. statisticians
used a four-stage sampling approach by first establishing a nationally representative
sampling frame from Primary Sampling Units (three-digit zip code tabulation areas). RTI
statisticians then selected sixty primary sampling units that had probabilities
corresponding to a composite size measure, weighting sixty primary sampling units with
a higher concentration of ethnic minorities (Emerson and Sikkink 2006, 2012). Over 120
five-digit zip codes were selected from the sixty primary sampling units. An average of
100 addresses were selected from each zip code. Two hundred and forty-eight postal
carrier routes were also selected from the selected five-digit zip codes. With forty-one
addresses selected per carrier route, the total number of addresses was 10,320. RTI
statisticians used the HOI (Half-open Interval) frame linking procedure to include
housing units that are not normally selected on mailing lists, one individual was then
selected per each housing unit. The goal amount of in-person interviews was 2,600 for
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the first wave of the study and a total of 2,610 interviews were conducted (Emerson and
Sikkink 2006, 2012). After the data collection process, weights were assigned to
respondents in Wave I to determine the probability of being selected at each stage.
Respondents were compensated $50 to complete the survey. Respondents were
also required to complete a screening interview prior to participating. The screening
interview was a paper and pencil interview while the official survey was administered
using a laptop computer. The response rate for the first wave was 58%. This was
calculated from an original amount of respondents who agreed to the interview (82%).
There was an 83% contact rate and an 86% screening rate. The data collection for the
second wave relied primarily on conducting online interviews with as many of the
original respondents from Wave I as possible.
The Portraits of American Life Study was divided into two separate waves. The
first wave, conducted in 2006, had a total of 2,610 respondents. The second wave,
conducted in 2012, included 1,417 respondents with 1,314 cases that were original
respondents from Wave I, while 103 cases were new respondents. The new respondents
were children of the parents in Wave I that were unable to participate in Wave II. This
analysis only included the 1,314 respondents who participated in both Wave I and II.
However, after excluding cases with missing values for select variables, the sample size
was reduced to 1,252 respondents.
The data collection relied on face-to-face interviews for the first wave, but
respondents also used computer-assisted self-interviewing (i.e. ACASI). ACASI was
used to help respondents answer more sensitive questions relating to deviance (Vargas
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2014). Abt SRBI conducted the second wave of the study. The response rate for the
second wave was 50.3 percent, which is a percentage based on all of the respondents
originally in the first wave. The adjusted response rate was 53%, when accounting for the
four percent of respondents who died or were mentally unable to take the survey. In the
second wave of the study, respondents were given the choice of a web or telephone
survey and a face-to-face interview. Respondents were compensated $30 if they
participated in the phone interview, but were otherwise compensated $50 for either the
web survey or the face-to-face interview (Emerson and Sikkink 2006, 2012).
Measures
The main independent variable, race, was recoded into dummy variables so that it
included a Black, Hispanic, and an “other race” variable. White was used as the reference
category in the analysis. This “other race” category included Pacific Islander, Native
American, Asian and Mixed race. These categories collectively made up a small
percentage of the racial distribution of the sample (6.5% weighted), as seen in Table 2
(next chapter).
The dependent variable, adherence to the color-blind ideology, measured the
extent to which respondents agreed or disagreed with the following statement at Wave II:
One of the most effective ways of dealing with race relations in the US is to stop talking
about race (1=Strongly disagree, 2=Somewhat disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree,
4=Somewhat agree, 5=Strongly agree). Previous studies have examined views toward the
current racial landscape in the United States (Jackson et al 2014; Neville et al. 2013), as
well as why United States citizens utilize the color-blind ideology in inter-race relations
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at the individual level (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Hastie and Rimmington 2014;
Vargas 2014). This survey item was used to address the degree to which respondents
agree or disagree with this ideology. This statement closely relates to the concept of
minimization, or the notion of a post-racial society. The same color-blind measure at
Wave I was used as a control variable, and the measure at Wave II was the main
dependent variable. The color-blind variable was recoded to include three categories in
both waves i.e. Agree, Neutral, and Disagree. The numerals are values; the titles are
categories. The categories were coded as 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The “Agree” measure
in Wave I was used as the reference category.
Subsequent ordinal logistic regression models added each mediating variable
individually, while excluding other mediating variables. One final model included all of
the mediating and control variables. The first mediating variable, geographic region, was
measured by asking respondents to identify their current geographic region through the
following response categories: (1=Northeast, 2=Midwest, 3=South, 4=West). The
“South” category was used as the reference category. The second mediating variable,
political ideology, was measured through the following question: when it comes to
politics, do you usually think of yourself as: (1=Very liberal, 2=Somewhat liberal,
3=Middle of the road, 4=Somewhat conservative, 5=Very conservative, 6=Haven’t
thought much about it). Political ideology was recoded into four categories, liberal,
conservative, middle of the road, and a category for respondents who do not give much
thought to political matters. Conservative was used as the reference category. Racial
identity was measured through the following question: How often, if at all, do you think
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about or are you aware of your race? The responses ranged from (1=About every day,
2=About once a week, 3=About once a month, 4=Less than monthly, 5=Never). These
categories were recoded into three main categories: 1=Daily/weekly (about every
day/about once a week), 2= Infrequently (about once a month/less than monthly), and
3=Never. The “daily/weekly” category was used as a reference category within the
regression models. Attitudes toward legal segregation were measured through responses
to the following statement: “It’s OK to have a country where the races are basically
separate from one another, as long as they have equal opportunity.” Responses then
followed a Likert scale format: (1=Strongly disagree, 2= Somewhat disagree, 3=Neither
disagree nor agree, 4=Somewhat agree, 5=Strongly Agree). The responses were recoded
to combine strongly disagree and somewhat disagree (3=Disagree), strongly agree and
somewhat agree (1=Agree), while maintaining a neutral category (2=Neutral). The
“Agree” category was used as a reference category in the regression models.
Other control variables included religious affiliation, age, education and gender.
Religious categories were recoded to include Roman Catholic, Mainline Protestant,
Evangelical Protestant, those with no religious affiliation, and an “other Protestant”
category. The “No-Affiliation” category was used as the reference category within the
models. It is important to control for religious affiliation due to the tendency of certain
congregations to be segregated by race (Emerson and Woo 2006), along with the
tendency of congregations to have strict and unwavering ideologies (Porter and Emerson
2013). Color-blind practices such as ignoring the relevance of race and focusing on
racism as an individual issue have been observed mainly among white evangelicals
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(Hearn 2009). Education categories were recoded to include Less than high school, High
School/GED, Vocational/Associates, Bachelors, Post-Graduate, and an “other education”
category. The “Less than high school” category was used as a reference category in the
regression models. This analysis also controlled for survey mode, by creating a dummy
variable to dichotomize the two different types of survey mode (1=Web, 0=In
person/telephone interview).
Statistical Procedure
In order to account for non-response bias, the study weighted the sample data in
both waves. The study included longitudinal weights to account for the non-responders in
Wave II. The weighting parameters for demographic characteristics were taken from an
analysis of the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, which was conducted in
2005 and 2011. The study created the variable LOWEIGHT which was intended to
represent the original sample, the weight PLOWEIGHT was constructed as a population
weight (Emerson and Sikkink 2006, 2012). These weights were adjusted using a raking
technique that helped match population proportions. The longitudinal weight variables
also controlled for sample selection bias. This accounted for whether the respondents
who dropped out between Wave I and Wave II were noticeably different compared to the
respondents who stayed. For this thesis, comparisons were made between Wave I and II
to observe the changing attitudes toward the color-blind ideology among the respondents
who participated in both waves. SPSS statistics 23 (IBM) was used to analyze descriptive
statistics and produce ordinal logistic regression models. Several ordinal logistic
regression models were estimated for the merged dataset.
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Cases were weighted in the merged dataset using the LOWEIGHT variable. This
data set only contained respondents who participated in both Wave I and II. There are
many different approaches to using a panel data (Selig, Preacher, and Little 2012). In the
past, researchers have used path analysis, fixed effect models, random effect models and
multilevel modeling when working with panel data (Frees 2004). These options are
unique in that they can map individual change through different regression or path
models. Panel data analysis also allows for the use of the time between the waves as a
control variable. These approaches were ideal for this study due to the use of an ordinallevel measure for the dependent variable. Panel studies in general, however, can be
beneficial due to the ability to observe different population parameters at different points
in time, to measure net change, and to aggregate data for a group of individuals (Duncan
and Kalton 1987).
This study used the color-blind measure at Wave I and II as two separate
variables, which both measure the same concept. Among other control variables in the
first ordinal logistic regression model, the color-blind measure at Wave I was included as
a control variable. This was used to describe the association between race and change in
adherence to the color-blind ideology, which changes as a function of the time between
the waves. This is what is referred to as a lagged-dependent variable regression (Selig et
al. 2012). The panel design was deemed to be appropriate after finding that there was
enough variation between the Wave I and II responses to the color-blind survey question.
A cross-tabulation of the responses to the measures can be found in Table 3 (next
chapter).
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The first ordinal logistic regression model included sex, age, race, education,
religion, respondent type, and the color-blind measure at Wave I. The main dependent
variable, the Wave II color-blind measure, was coded (1=Agree, 2=Neutral, 3=Disagree).
Models two, three, four and five included a new mediating variable in order to observe
the effects each variable had on attitudes toward the color-blind ideology. The final
model, model six, included all of the mediating and control variables. All of the ordinal
logistic regression models can be found in Table 4 (next chapter).
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS
Weighted and un-weighted descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 2 (below).
As can be seen, more than half of the respondents were white (54.3%), while 19.5% were
black, 14.5% were Hispanic, and 11.7% identified as another race. The majority of the
respondents were female (62.1%). After the data were weighted, the percentage of female
respondents was reduced to 51.5%. The mean value for age was 42.53 (SD= 15.5).
Slightly over one-forth (26.8%) of the respondents identified as Roman Catholic, 22.6%
identified as Evangelical Protestant, 16.3% identified as Unaffiliated, 10.5% identified as
Mainline Protestant, 8.9% identified as Black Protestant, 8.3% identified as “other faith,”
and 6.6% identified as “Protestant – Other.” In terms of educational attainment, 34.7% of
the respondents had a high school diploma or GED (General Education Diploma), 22.2%
had a Bachelor’s degree, 21.1% had a vocational or Associates degree, and 12.1% said
that they had a postgraduate degree. Very few respondents (7.6%) had less than a high
school education, while 2.4% said that they had an “other” form of education.
In regards to geographic region, 33.5% of the respondents lived in the South,
31.1% lived in the West, 19.2% lived in the Midwest and 16.2% lived in the Northeast.
For Political Ideology, 26.7% were Conservative, 25.9% did not give much thought to
political matters, 24.3% were Liberal and 23.2% identified as “Middle of the Road.” In
relation to racial identity, 34.7% of respondents reported that they were daily or weekly
aware of their own race, while 38% of respondents were infrequently aware of their race
and 27.2% were never aware of their race. For attitudes toward legal segregation, the
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majority of respondents disagreed (60.9%), while 22.8% were neutral and 16.3% agreed.
For the color-blind measure at Wave I 40.4% of the respondents agreed with the colorblind ideology, while 37.5% disagreed and 22.0% were neutral. In Wave II, 49.4% of the
respondents agreed with the color-blind ideology, 32.9% disagreed, and 17.7% were
neutral. Compared to Wave I, respondents were more inclined to agree with the colorideology and less likely to disagree at Wave II, therefore respondents were generally
more color-blind in 2012 compared to 2006.
____________________
Refer to Table 2, page 77
____________________
Table 3 displays a cross-tabulation of the color-blind measure at Wave II
by the color-blind measure at Wave I. As can be seen in table 3, when comparing
respondents who agreed with the color-blind ideology at Wave I, 64.6% also agreed with
the color-blind ideology at Wave II. In regards to respondents who disagreed with the
color-blind ideology at Wave I, 36.2% of those respondents agreed with the color-blind
ideology at Wave II. Additionally, 48.1% of respondents who disagreed with the colorblind ideology in Wave I also disagreed in Wave II. Therefore, respondents who
originally agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I were less inclined to change
their response.
____________________
Refer to Table 3, page 91
____________________
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The ordinal logistic regression models can be found in Table 4. In terms of
general race observations in Model 1 (χ= 194.68, df = 19), blacks were 186% more likely
than whites to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology, this relationship
was statistically significant (OR= 2.86, p = .000 < .05). Hispanics were 56% more likely
than whites to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology (OR= 1.56, p = .024
< .05). Age (OR= .00, p = .973 > .05) and gender (OR= .98, p = .918 > .05) were not
significantly associated with adherence to the color-blind ideology in any of the models.
Identifying as an Evangelical Protestant was significantly associated with adherence to
the color-blind ideology (OR= .59, p = .007 < .05), and the odds ratio of .59 indicated
that Evangelical Protestants were 41% less likely than unaffiliated respondents to have a
stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. In regards to educational attainment,
those possessing a bachelor’s degree were 81% (OR= 1.81, p = .018 < .05) more likely
than those with less than a high school education to have a stronger opposition to the
color-blind ideology. Those possessing a post-graduate degree were 195% (OR= 2.95, p
= .000 < .05) more likely than those with less than a high school education to have a
stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. When observing the color-blind measure
at Wave I as a control variable, those who disagreed with the color-blind ideology in
Wave I were 243% (OR= 3.43, p = .000 < .01) more likely than those who agreed with
the color-blind ideology in Wave I to oppose the color-blind ideology in Wave II.
Respondents who were neutral in Wave I were 162% (OR= 2.62, p = .000 < .01) more
likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to have a stronger
opposition to the color-blind ideology. In model 1 approximately 14.5-16.8% of the
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variation in adherence to the color-blind ideology at Wave II could be explained by the
predictors in the model.
When geographic region was added in Model 2 (χ= 202.384, df = 22), blacks
were 193% (OR=2.93, p = .000 < .05) more likely than whites to indicate opposition to
the color-blind ideology. Hispanics were 50% (OR= 1.50, p = .042 < .05) more likely
than whites to indicate opposition to the color-blind ideology. Evangelical Protestants
were 36% (OR= .64, p = .18 < .05) less likely than unaffiliated respondents to indicate
stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Identically to Model 1, those possessing a
bachelor’s degree were 81% (OR= 1.81, p = .018 < .05) more likely than those with less
than a high school education to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology.
However, those possessing a post-graduate degree were now 204% (OR= 3.04, p = .000
< .05) more likely than those with less than a high school education to have a stronger
opposition to the color-blind ideology. Those who disagreed with the color-blind
ideology in Wave I were 227% (OR= 3.27, p = .000 < .05) more likely than those who
agree with the color-blind ideology to disagree with the color-blind ideology in Wave II.
Respondents who were neutral in Wave I were 154% (OR= 2.54, p = .000 < .05) more
likely than respondents who agreed with the color-blind ideology to show stronger
opposition to the color-blind ideology in Wave II. None of the geographic regions were
significantly associated with the color-blind ideology (p = > .05), however Northeastern
residents were 26% (OR= 1.26, p = .179 > .05) more likely than Southern residents to
have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Respondents residing in the West
were 30% (OR= 1.30, p = .098 > .05) more likely than Southern residents to have a
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stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. In model 2 approximately 15-17.5% of
the variation in adherence to the color-blind ideology at Wave II could be explained by
the predictors in the model.
When political ideology was added in Model 3 (χ= 200.23, df = 22), blacks were
191% (OR= 2.91, p = .000 < .05) more likely than whites to have a stronger opposition to
the color-blind ideology. Hispanics were 55% more likely than whites to have a stronger
opposition to the color-blind ideology (OR= 1.55, p = .027 < .05). Identifying as an
Evangelical Protestant was significantly associated with adherence to the color-blind
ideology (OR= .62, p = .015 < .05), and Evangelical Protestants were 38% less likely
than unaffiliated respondents to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology. In
regards to educational attainment, those possessing a bachelor’s degree were 66% more
likely than those with less than a high school education to have a strong opposition to the
color-blind ideology, however this relationship was no longer statistically significant in
Model 3 (OR= 1.66, p = .051 > .05). Those possessing a post-graduate degree were 160%
(OR= 2.60, p = .001 < .05) more likely than those with less than a high school education
to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology. When observing the Color-Blind
measure in Wave I as a control variable, those who disagreed with the color-blind
ideology in Wave I were 234% (OR= 3.34, p = .000 < .01) more likely than those who
agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to oppose the color-blind ideology in
Wave II. Respondents who were neutral in Wave I were 167% (OR= 2.67, p = .000 <.01)
more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to indicate
opposition to the color-blind ideology. Although liberals were 32% more likely than
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conservatives to indicate stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology, this relationship
was not statistically significant (OR= 1.32, p = .10 > .05). In model 3 approximately
14.9-17.3% of the variation in adherence to the color-blind ideology at Wave II could be
explained by the predictors in the model.
When racial identity was added into model 4 (χ= 198.57, df = 21), blacks were
161% (OR= 2.61, p = .000 < .05) more likely than whites to have a stronger opposition to
the color-blind ideology. Hispanics were 35% more likely than whites to have a strong
opposition to the color-blind ideology, however this relationship was no longer
statistically significant as it was in the previous models (OR= 1.35, p = .146 > .05).
Identifying as an Evangelical Protestant was significantly associated with adherence to
the color-blind ideology (OR= .59, p = .006 < .05), and Evangelical Protestants were 41%
less likely than unaffiliated respondents to have a strong opposition to the color-blind
ideology. Additionally, Roman Catholics were 33% (OR= 1.33, p =. 048 < .05) less
likely than unaffiliated respondents to have a strong opposition to the color-blind
ideology. In regards to educational attainment, those possessing a bachelor’s degree were
80% (OR= 1.80, p = .019 < .05) more likely than those with less than a high school
education to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology. Those possessing a
post-graduate degree were 191% (OR= 2.91, p = .000 < .05) more likely than those with
less than a high school education to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology.
For the Color-Blind measure in Wave I, those who disagreed with the color-blind
ideology in Wave I were 243% (OR= 3.43, p = .000 <.01) more likely than those who
agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to oppose the color-blind ideology in
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Wave II. Respondents who were neutral in Wave I were 159% (OR= 2.59, p = .000 <
.01) more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to have a
stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Respondents indicating that they were not
frequently aware of their race were 26% (OR= .74, p = .048 < .05) less likely than
respondents who were aware of their race daily to have a strong opposition to the colorblind ideology. Respondents who were never aware of their race were 21% less likely
than respondents who were aware of their race daily to have a strong opposition to the
color-blind ideology, however this relationship was not statistically significant (OR= .79,
p = .143 > .05). In model 4 approximately 14.8-17.2% of the variation in adherence to the
color-blind ideology at Wave II could be explained by the predictors in the model.
In Model 5 (χ= 201.37, df = 21), which included attitudes toward legal
segregation as a mediating variable, blacks were 198% (OR= 2.98, p = .000 < .05) more
likely than whites to have stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Hispanics were
59% more likely than whites to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology
(OR= 1.59, p = .146 > .05). Identifying as an Evangelical Protestant was significantly
associated with adherence to the color-blind ideology (OR= .60, p = .006 < .05), and
Evangelical Protestants were 40% less likely than unaffiliated respondents to have a
stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Those possessing a bachelor’s degree
were 71% (OR= 1.71, p = .035 < .05) more likely than those with less than a high school
education to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Those possessing a
post-graduate degree were 181% (OR= 2.81, p = .000 < .05) more likely than those with
less than a high school education to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology.
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For the Color-Blind measure in Wave I, those who disagreed with the color-blind
ideology in Wave I were 233% (OR= 3.33, p = .000 < .01) more likely than those who
agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to oppose the color-blind ideology in
Wave II. Respondents who were neutral in Wave I were 155% (OR= 2.55, p = .000 <
.01) more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I to have a
stronger to the color-blind ideology. Respondents who disagreed with legal segregation
were 51% (OR= 1.51, p = .018 < .05) more likely than respondents who agreed with legal
segregation to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. Interestingly,
respondents who were neutral toward legal segregation were 59% (OR= 1.59, p = .015 <
.05). more likely than respondents who agreed with legal segregation to have a stronger
opposition to the color-blind ideology. In model 5 approximately 15-17.4% of the
variation in adherence to the color-blind ideology at Wave II could be explained by the
predictors in the model.
The final ordinal logistic regression model, Model 6 (χ= 217.66, df = 29),
included all of the control variables along with geographic region, political ideology,
racial identity and attitudes toward legal segregation. Similar to the first model, blacks
were 186% (p = .000 < .05) more likely than whites to have stronger opposition to the
color-blind ideology. Hispanics were 36% more likely than whites to have a stronger
opposition to the color-blind ideology, however, just as in model 4, this relationship was
no longer statistically significant as it was in the other models (OR= 1.36, p = .148 > .05).
In regards to religious affiliation, Evangelical Protestants were 33% less likely than
unaffiliated respondents to have a strong opposition to the color-blind ideology. In
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regards to educational attainment, those possessing a bachelor’s degree were 58% more
likely than those with less than a high school education to have a stronger opposition to
the color-blind ideology, however this relationship was no longer statistically significant
(OR= 1.58, p = .078 > .05). Those possessing a post-graduate degree were 155% (OR=
2.55, p = .001 < .05) more likely than those with less than a high school education to
have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. For the Color-Blind measure in
Wave I, those who disagreed with the color-blind ideology in Wave I were 210% (OR=
3.10, p = .000 < .01) more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology in
Wave I to oppose the color-blind ideology in Wave II. Respondents who were neutral in
Wave I were 149% (OR= 2.49, p = .000 < .01) more likely than those who agreed with
the color-blind ideology in Wave I to indicate opposition to the color-blind ideology. In
model 6 approximately 16.1-18.7% of the variation in adherence to the color-blind
ideology at Wave II could be explained by the predictors in the model.
Just as in Model 1, geographic region was not significant in predicting attitudes
toward the color-blind ideology in the final model. None of the categories for political
ideology or racial identity were statistically significant. However, respondents indicating
that they disagreed with legal segregation were 48% (OR= 1.48, p = .025 < .05) more
likely than respondents who agreed with legal segregation to have a stronger opposition
to the color-blind ideology. Respondents who were neutral to legal segregation were 62%
more likely than respondents who agree with legal segregation to have a strong
opposition to the color-blind ideology, however this relationship was not statistically
significant (OR= 1.62, p = .012 < .05).
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____________________
Refer to Table 4, page 92
____________________
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CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION
This study examined the relationship between race and adherence to the colorblind ideology. Using data from both waves of the Portraits of American Life Study, this
study examined attitudes toward the color-blind ideology from the respondents who
participated in both waves of the study. This study contributed a longitudinal perspective
to the color-blind ideology, and added new information regarding the mediators of this
relationship. Previous studies have focused on the relationship between race and the
color-blind ideology (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Lewis 2001; Awad et al. 2005;
Zamudio and Rios 2006; Hughey et al. 2015), but the mediators of this relationship
previously were unknown.
The current study highlighted the racial divide in regards to attitudes toward
dealing with race related issues in the United States. This study validated other research
stating that black individuals are much more likely to suggest that racism is still a major
problem in the United States, this has been confirmed among millennials, who are
growing into the “new” politics of race (Cohen 2011; Bobo 2011; Pew Research 2016).
This difference is still evident today, even with President Barack Obama’s election in
2008, which was the presumed landmark of post-racialism. The current study on colorblindness provided new insights on the multidimensional concept of the color-blind
ideology, showing that there are still race differences in regards to addressing racial
tensions within the United States.
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This study can contribute to public policy decisions on social programs that are
available to ethnic minorities. Race relations cannot improve simply by not discussing
race, not talking about race is not going to erase race as a concept or racism as a reality.
Education programs can enforce the fact that upward mobility for ethnic minorities is not
due to cultural inferiority, and that race is a social fact in contemporary society. These
ideas are at odds with the assumptions of the color-blind ideology, because it posits that
race no longer matters, and that it has been erased entirely. Under the lens of colorblindness, it is seen as unnecessary to develop social programs that benefit racial
minorities if race is no longer relevant or “unseen.” However, racism persists.
Although some Americans have argued that the election of the first African
American president is the landmark for a post-racial society, many Americans also have
argued that Barack Obama’s presidency has worsened race relations (Pew Research
Center 2016). Barack Obama’s presidential election in 2008 was deemed as the “weapon
of choice” used by whites to justify color-blind stances (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011),
and to further the notion of a post-racial society. There is not only a racial divide in
regards to this issue, but other variables such as political affiliation also show noticeable
differences in responses to race-based issues in the United States. According to a recent
Pew Research Center study (2016), 63% of white Republicans indicated that President
Obama worsened race relations in the United States compared to just 5% of white
Democrats. Additionally, 78% of white Democrats agreed that more changes are
necessary in order to strive for racial equality in the United States compared to only 36%
of white Republicans (Pew Research Center 2016). Additionally, it was found that 49%
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of white Democrats indicated that their race has served as an advantage to “get ahead” in
life (Pew Research Center 2016). This leaves more to be desired in the pursuit of racial
equality in the United States. One of the most important findings from this study
indicated that four out of ten blacks indicated that they were doubtful that the United
States would ever reach a standard of racial equality (Pew Research Center 2016). These
findings indicated that there are large race-based differences on how to deal with racial
tensions in the United States, and there is still more to be done.
Discussion of the Results
There was a clear racial difference in attitudes toward color-blindness, even when
controlling for prior attitudes. Blacks and Hispanics were more likely than were whites to
disagree with the color-blind ideology. This was found in all of the ordinal logistic
regression models. In Model 1, blacks were 186% more likely than were whites to have a
stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. This confirmed the first hypothesis that
predicted that blacks and other races would be more likely to oppose the color-blind
ideology compared to whites. The sizeable gap between whites and other races suggests
that there is a clear divide on how to address racial tensions within the United States. This
validated previous findings, which emphasized the racial divide on addressing racerelated issues in the United States (Bobo 2011; Bunyasi 2015; Pew Research 2016). This
indicated that whites are much more likely to be color-blind than blacks and Hispanics,
and whites are generally more inclined to ignore the continuing relevance of race in
contemporary society by not discussing race.
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Geographic region did not mediate the relationship between race and attitudes
toward the color-blind ideology. Therefore, the second hypothesis was not supported.
However, geographic region did strengthen the odds of blacks and Hispanics having a
stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology compared to whites. When geographic
region was added in model 2 blacks were 193% more likely than whites to have a
stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology, however in model 1 blacks were only
186% more likely than whites to oppose the color-blind ideology. This suggests that
geographic region does strengthen the stance toward the color-blind ideology.
Geographic region was not significant in the model potentially due to the variable being
used as a proxy, but also due to the limited number of four geographic regions used in the
study.
Political ideology did not mediate the relationship between race and the colorblind ideology, therefore the third hypothesis was not supported. Similar to geographic
region, adding political ideology into the model strengthened the odds for blacks and
Hispanics of opposing the color-blind ideology. Liberals were 32% more likely than were
conservatives to have a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology in Model 3. This
validated previous literature focusing on progressive political ideologies that tend to
acknowledge racial inequality (Bonilla-Silva 2012; Wilkins and Wegner 2014). However,
no political ideology variables were statistically significant in Model 3 or in the final
model. There have been distinctions found between political affiliation and the colorblind ideology (Pew Research 2016), and similar differences were found in this analysis.
Political ideology did increase the odds ratios for blacks, but the same was not true for
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Hispanics. Those showing pessimism about the current state of racial affairs in the United
States are more likely Liberal than conservative (Pew Research 2008), but this
relationship is more relevant for blacks than it is for Hispanics.
Racial identity mediated the relationship between race and the color-blind
ideology, therefore the fourth hypothesis was supported. In model 4 blacks were 161%
more likely than were whites to indicate a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology.
However, in model 1 blacks were 186% more likely than were whites to indicate a
stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. This suggests that blacks do have strong
racial identities as previously confirmed by the Multidimensional Model
Multidimensional Model of Racial Identity (Sellers et al. 1998). However, Hispanics
were only 32% more likely than were whites to indicate stronger opposition to the colorblind ideology. Once racial identity was added to the model, the relationship between
Hispanics and the color-blind ideology was no longer significant (p = .146 > .05). This
indicates that Hispanics might not have strong racial identities compared to blacks.
When legal segregation was added in Model 5, it did not mediate the relationship
between race and the color-blind ideology. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis was not
supported. Blacks were 198% more likely than whites to have a stronger opposition to the
color-blind ideology. This was the highest level of opposition observed in any of the
models. Hispanics were 59% more likely than whites to indicate a stronger opposition to
the color-blind ideology; this was a 3% increase from Model 1. Disagreement (p = .018 <
.05) and neutral attitudes (p = .015 < .05) toward legal segregation were both
significantly associated with opposition to the color-blind ideology. Those indicating
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neutral attitudes toward legal segregation were 59% more likely than those indicating
agreement with legal segregation to indicate stronger opposition to the color-blind
ideology. This differed from those who disagreed with legal segregation, who were 56%
more likely than those indicating agreement with legal segregation to indicate stronger
opposition to the color-blind ideology. Attitudes toward segregated communities are
closely related to the color-blind ideology (Rugh and Massey 2013) and the assumption
of naturalization (Bonilla-Silva 2012) in that segregation of communities based on race is
dismissed as a natural phenomenon. Therefore, it is not surprising that those who
disagree with or are neutral to legal segregation are also likely to disagree with the colorblind ideology.
In the final model, blacks were 186% more likely than whites to indicate a
stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. This was the same figure for Model 1,
which did not include any of the mediating variables. Hispanics were 36% more likely
than whites to indicate a stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology (p = .148 > .05).
This was a 1% increase from Model 4 and a 20% decrease from Model 1. When
observing the effects of the mediating variables, the legal segregation variables were the
only variables that were significantly associated with the color-blind ideology. This could
be related to the correlation between the color-blind ideology and failing to recognize the
relevance of race in the segregation of communities (Rugh and Massey 2013).
In regards to other demographic findings, higher levels of education (more
specifically a post-graduate or bachelor’s degree) were associated with a stronger
opposition to the color-blind ideology. This was especially evident in model 2, when
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geographic region was added as a mediator. Those having a post-graduate degree were
204% more likely than were those with less than a high school education to have a
stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology. This validated previous research stating
that higher education levels are associated with an acknowledgment of the relevance of
race in everyday life (Pew Research Center 2016). Color-blind responses from Wave I
were highly predictive of color-blind responses at Wave II. This was mostly evident in
Models 1 and 4, where those who disagreed with the color-blind ideology at Wave I were
243% more likely than those who agreed with the color-blind ideology at Wave I to
indicate stronger opposition to the color-blind ideology at Wave II.
Limitations
The current study has several limitations. The first limitation, as should be
expected, is that there was attrition between the two waves of the Portraits of American
Life Study (47%). The attrition limits a complete comparison of how attitudes to the
color-blind ideology changed among this group of respondents. However, there are
longitudinal variable weights for the second wave, which accommodated for the attrition
between Wave I and II. This allowed for a nationally representative sample to be
maintained.
The next limitation is related to the measure for the dependent variable. Ideally,
more questions could be asked that also measured attitudes or adherence to the colorblind ideology. Other studies have employed scales that measure different aspects of this
concept (confer Neville et al. 2013). The second wave of the survey also included many
more variables, and included a variety of race-related questions that were not asked in
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Wave I. Ideally more mediating variables could be included in the model, but a number
of questions on racial or ethnic diversity were only asked in Wave II when the sample
size was greatly reduced.
It can be argued that it is problematic to measure prejudiced attitudes using a
survey that is conducted face to face (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Zamudio and Rios
2006). Respondents could be more inclined to indicate a more socially acceptable
response rather than their actual thoughts (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Zamudio and
Rios 2006). This might be especially relevant during in-person interviews when the
interviewee is of another race. However, race of the interviewee was not reported in this
study. Racist attitudes can be further expanded upon through qualitative methods.
Additionally, it is likely that people might be more forthcoming when filling out an
anonymous survey than when being interviewed in person.
Suggestions for Future Research
Future studies could add to this growing body of research in the sociology of race
and ethnicity. Further studies should be conducted on the color-blind ideology, not only
through survey questions, but also from a combination of qualitative and ethnographic
studies. Other studies could examine other mediating and or moderating factors that
could not be analyzed with these data. Additionally, further research can be conducted on
color-blindness and attitudes towards the presumed absence of racism in contemporary
society.
It is important to account for the “new” politics of race (Logan 2014) and how
this “new” political landscape could further shape views toward social policy (Cohen
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2011; Bunyasi 2015). It has been stated that racial division is critical in the understanding
of the welfare state (Williams 2003), as well as what this means for the future of racepolicy relationships (Brown 2013). In addition to furthering the understanding of racepolicy relationships, it is also important to examine further the importance of racial
identities, segregation by race, and political ideology. The characteristics of the “new”
politics of race are related to an avoidance of race-based discussions that are considered
divisive, an acceptance of racial progress in the United States, and a disassociation from
race-based policies, which are considered unfair. This “new” politics of race also
suggests that lower-class black citizens are lower-class citizens due to their own cultural
deficiencies (Logan 2014). The “new” politics of race coincide with the “new” racism in
that there is a desire to avoid addressing race-based issues and to preserve the status quo.
Aside from these variables, more studies could elaborate on the racial divide
without dichotomizing into black and white individuals. Further, racial identities among
Hispanics and members of other races should be further examined to better understand
more fully how awareness of one’s racial identity influences their stance on colorblindness and other race-based issues. It is critical to understand how these variables
shape opinions toward race-based policies and life chances to better address racerelations in the United States. Moving forward, it is necessary to address the
rationalizations for the color-blind ideology and continued structural inequality (Hughey
et al. 2015). If proponents of the color-blind ideology assume that race has been erased,
more scholarship may be necessary to explain further the racialized social system that we
inhabit. The relevance of race in everyday life is evident in education and admissions
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policies (Augoustinos et al. 2005; Thomason 2016; Liptak 2016) to broader political
practices (Logan 2014), and the biological sciences (Morning 2014; Byrd and Hughey
2015; Gillborn 2016).
While race has not been erased from contemporary society, the relevance and
importance of race has been erased from the realities of many living in the “post-racial”
America of today. The racial divide will continue to exist until racial matters are taken
more seriously. To initiate this, racial matters in the United States must first be discussed.
The aversion to discussing race and racial inequality among mixed-race communities
only contributes to persisting racial inequality by not addressing or acknowledging its
importance in contemporary society. The importance of race has not been “erased” as
much as it has been brushed under the rug, ignored until it has been brought to the surface
again. It was brought to the surface in 2008 during the presidential election, but has since
been brushed back. The relevance of race must be made clear in public policies to
promote further a fair and just society, one in which the color-blind ideology promotes
but does not fully endorse.
In conclusion, this study shed light on a longitudinal perspective on the colorblind ideology. It was found that racial identity mediated the relationship between race
and opposition to the color-blind ideology. This confirmed the fourth hypothesis. There
were large racial differences in regards to attitudes toward the color-blind ideology, with
blacks and Hispanics being much more likely to disagree with this ideology compared to
whites, this confirmed the first hypothesis. Although geographic region, political
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ideology and attitudes toward legal segregation did not mediate this relationship, these
variables further strengthened this racial divide.
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Appendix A: Figures

Figure 1: Anticipated Mediators of the Relationship between Race and Adherence
to the Color-Blind Ideology
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Appendix B: Tables

Table 1: Previous Empirical Work on Color-Blind Racism
Author/Year

Methods/Data
Source
1997 Social
Attitudes of
College
Students
Survey
including indepth
interviews

Sample

Objective

Findings

Implications

451 white
college
students

To examine
the extent to
which surveys
underestimate
prejudiced
attitudes
compared to
in-depth (in
person)
interviews

Responses
varied between
data collection
modes in that
there were
contradictions
between
responses
given in the
survey
compared to
responses
given during
the interviews.

Lewis (2001)

Ethnographic
study during
1997-98 school
year. Formal
and informal
interviews were
conducted with
students, staff
and parents of
students in an
elementary
school.

489
elementary
school
students (90%
white),
unidentified
number of
parents and
administrators
.

Understanding
how race
operates in a
school
environment
that is
predominantly
white.

Many students
and faculty
espoused
color-blind
viewpoints
about the
community
and the school,
even though
the community
was largely
segregated by
race.

Awad,
Cokley and
Ravitch
(2005)

Convenience
sample from a
large
Midwestern
university

375 college
students in the
Midwest,
58.7% white

To assess
attitudes
toward
affirmative
action
programs

Attitudes
toward
affirmative
action differed
by race. Colorblind and
modern racist
attitudes were
associated
with
affirmative
action
attitudes.

Defending
white
supremacy is no
longer based on
Jim Crow
racism but is
rooted in the
subtle nature of
color-blind
racism. Survey
questions alone
may not be
adequate for
assessing all
components of
color-blindness.
Understanding
how race
operates is
important even
within
environments
populated
mostly by
whites.
Multicultural
education is not
only for
students of
color.
Attitudes
toward
affirmative
action are not
proxies of racial
attitudes. Colorblindness and
individual
prejudice may
differ.

Bonilla-Silva
and Forman
(2000)
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Zamudio and
Rios (2006)

Data taken
from Picca and
Feagin’s (2007)
analysis

Journals from
60 (951
entries) of the
original 626
white college
students from
the Picca and
Feagin data
set which was
collected from
2002-2003

Analyze
different
characteristics
of color-blind
racism in
comparison to
traditional
racism in the
journals

Picca and
Feagin (2007)

Journal entries
collected from
college
students’
journals among
28 colleges.

626 white
college
students from
28 colleges in
the United
States,
collected
2002-2003.

Observe
racialized
actions,
performers,
observers of
these actions
and the racial
framing of
these actions.

Cabrera
(2011)

Semi-structured
interviews
conducted in

12 white
college
students from
a university in
the Western
region of the
United States

Observe the
minimization
of racism in
higher
education by
white college
students

Rugh and
Massey
(2013)

Decennial
Census of
Housing and
Population
(1970-2010)

White, Black,
Hispanic
residents of
the United
States
(Residents
from 287
metropolitan
statistical
areas)

Observe the
segregation
patterns by the
decade from
1970 to 2010
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Entries
coinciding
with
traditional
racism and
themes of
white
supremacy
were more
frequent than
entries relating
to color-blind
racism.
Significant
differences
were found
between how
whites behave
in public and
how they
express their
views in the
backstage.
The white
students
blamed
minority
students for
perpetuating
“reverse
racism” and
expressed
hostility
toward
multiculturalis
-m
Whites still
remain
segregated
from other
ethnic groups.
The Hispanic
population has
grown
substantially,
and Black
segregation is
still high in
some regions

Racism is
played out in a
number of
different ways.
There are a
number of
different
rationalizations
for color-blind
or traditional
racism.

Racial
prejudices can
be concealed
and may not
manifest
themselves in
the “front stage”
as much as they
do in the “back
stage.”
Affirmative
action and
multiculturalism
are met with
hostility by
some white
college student,
who claimed
that they were
the supposed
victims of these
policies
Areas exhibiting
high education
levels and low
anti-Black and
anti-Latino
sentiment are
areas that are
integrating at
higher rates.
Segregation
may be
increasing in
some

but has
decreased
overall from
1970-2010.
Those who did
discuss and
acknowledge
white privilege
were more
likely to
acknowledge
structural
inequality,
with those who
are color-blind
not
acknowledging
white
privilege.

metropolitan
areas while
decreasing in
others.
The analysis
provided
predictive
characteristics
of attitudes
toward
affirmative
action through
acknowledgmen
t of white
privilege, and
what this means
for attitudes on
public policy.
Provided
another
perspective to
the justification
for continued
segregation: that
underrepresente
d groups “create
and perpetuate
separation.”
This validated
research
suggesting that
segregation is a
natural
phenomenon.
Privilege
reporting whites
were more
likely to support
diversity-based
affirmative
action.
Disadvantaged
whites also
were more
likely to oppose
affirmative
action. This
may lend more
information to
attitudes toward
public policy

Hastie and
Rimmington
(2014)

Discussion
board
comments on
six news
articles from
the New York
Times that
focused on a
U.S. Supreme
Court ruling on
racial
discrimination

357 discussion
board
comments
posted to the
New York
Times article
“Detecting
Race Bias in
Workplaces”
in 2009

To address
examples of
white
privilege and
the denial of
structural
inequality
within the
comments
regarding
affirmative
action

Jackson,
Sweeney and
Welcher
(2014)

14 group
interviews,
divided
homogeneously
by race

14 groups, a
total of 72
students

To address
racial
segregation on
college
campuses, as
well as if
cross-group
interaction is
desired, and
the reasoning
for lack of
contact.

The white
segregation
was
characterized
as a natural
occurrence,
and both
minority and
white students
blamed the
“other” for the
lack of
integration.

Bunyasi
(2015)

Five global
telephone
interviews from
2000-2009

Sample sizes
ranged from
684-1,040
across the
polls

Address white
privilege
along with
white identity
to ask
questions
relating to
upward
mobility in the
workplace,
affirmative
action, and
other political
issues.

Privilege
reporting and
color-blind
whites were
both likely
than
disadvantages
whites to
support
affirmative
action.
Privilege
reporting
whites were
more likely to
support
diversity-based
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McDermott
(2015)

The American
Community
Survey (2011)

16,632 nonHispanic
whites

Assess how
different white
identities
(white,
American,
ethnic, none)
are related to
color-blind
and colorvisible
ideologies

Modica
(2015)

Convenience
sample of white
high school
students from
Excellence
Academy (EA)
located in
Woodlark.

Conducted 26
total
interviews: 20
with students,
6 with
teachers or
administrators

To understand
responses to
multi-cultural
literature in a
suburban
public school
setting
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affirmative
action
compared to
other groups.
Whites arrived
at conclusions
consistent with
the color-blind
ideology
through
different
pathways
depending on
their ancestry
or selfproclaimed
“white”
identity.
There was an
overall
aversion to
discussing race
in the
classroom, for
fear of being
labeled racist.
Most students
used a reverse
racism
discourse to
explain racebased issues.

based on white
racial identity.

Un-hyphenated
white ethnic
identities can
help lend
information on
voting behavior,
with nonhyphenated
whites being
more likely to
identify as
Republican
compared to
hyphenated
white identities.
Productive
classroom
discussions
were avoided
due to a colorblind and
reverse racism
discourse
exhibited by the
students.
Mentioning the
“R” word
(Race), was
generally
associated with
being labeled a
racist.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
(n=1,252)
Variable

n

Color-Blind Ideology Wave I
Strongly Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree

296
174
276
270
236

23.6
13.9
22.0
21.6
18.8

19.4
13.8
24.0
22.9
20.0

Color-Blind Ideology Wave I
(Recoded)
Disagree
Neutral
Agree

470
276
506

37.5
22.0
40.4

33.2
24.0
42.8

Color-Blind Ideology Wave II
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither disagree nor agree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree

247
165
221
275
344

19.7
13.2
17.7
22.0
27.5

15.4
11.7
17.6
24.3
31.1

Color-Blind Ideology Wave II
(Recoded)
Disagree
Neutral
Agree

412
221
619

32.9
17.7
49.4

27.0
17.6
55.4

Attitudes Toward Legal Segregation
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree

582
180
286
115
89

46.5
14.4
22.8
9.20
7.10

41.5
15.5
26.0
9.20
7.90

762
286
204

60.9
22.8
16.3

56.9
26.0
17.1

Attitudes Toward Legal Segregation
(Recoded)
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Racial Identity
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Un-weighted %
Mean(SD)

Weighted %
Mean(SD)

Variable

n

Every day
Nearly every day
Weekly
Monthly
Less than monthly
Never

324
110
123
86
268
341

25.9
8.80
9.80
6.90
21.4
27.2

20.2
8.70
8.90
6.70
22.8
32.6

Racial Identity (Recoded)
Daily aware of own race
Not frequently aware of own race
Never aware of own race

434
477
341

34.7
38.0
27.2

29.0
37.8
33.2

Geographic Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West

203
241
419
389

16.2
19.2
33.5
31.1

17.2
24.9
32.7
25.2

Political Ideology
Very liberal
Somewhat liberal
Middle of the road
Somewhat conservative
Very conservative
Haven't thought much about it

94
210
290
249
85
324

7.50
16.8
23.2
19.9
6.80
25.9

5.80
16.1
24.7
20.6
7.90
25.0

304
290
334
324

24.3
23.2
26.7
25.9

21.8
24.7
28.5
25.0

680
244
181
90
5
4
32

54.3
19.5
14.5
7.20
0.40
0.30
2.60

69.5
11.2
12.5
4.70
0.10
0.20
0.90

Political Ideology (Recoded)
Liberal
Middle of the road
Conservative
Do not give much thought
to political matters
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Native American
Pacific Islander
Mixed Race
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Un-weighted %
Mean(SD)

Weighted %
Mean(SD)

Variable
Other

n

Un-weighted %
Mean(SD)

Weighted %
Mean(SD)

16

1.30

0.90

680
244
181
147

54.3
19.5
14.5
11.7
42.53(15.51)

69.4
11.2
12.5
6.9
44.99(16.22)

Sex
Male
Female

474
778

37.9
62.1

48.5
51.5

Education
Less than high school
GED
High School
Vocational-technical
Associate
Bachelor's
Master's/Master’s of divinity
Doctorate
Professional degree
Other

95
61
373
117
147
278
111
15
25
30

7.60
4.90
29.8
9.30
11.7
22.2
8.80
1.20
2.0
2.40

9.40
6.80
34.9
8.30
10.0
17.0
7.50
0.90
2.40
2.80

Education (Recoded)
Less than high school
High School/GED
Vocational/Associates
Bachelor's
Post Graduate Degree
Other

95
434
264
278
151
30

7.60
34.7
21.1
22.2
12.1
2.40

9.40
35.7
18.5
21.4
9.20
5.80

Religion
Christian
Muslim
Jewish
Roman Catholic
Mormon
Buddhist
Hindu

629
4
24
335
6
24
14

50.2
0.30
1.90
26.8
0.50
1.90
1.10

57.5
0.50
1.50
21.0
0.40
0.60
1.60

Race (Recoded)
White
Black
Hispanic
Other Race
Age
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Variable

n

Un-weighted %
Mean(SD)

Agnostic
Atheist
Spiritual
Don't give religious things much
thought
Other
Religion (Recoded)
Black Protestant
Evangelical Protestant
Mainline Protestant
Catholic
Other faith
Un-affiliated
Protestant –Other
Respondent Type
Web
In person/other

41
16
116
31

3.30
1.30
9.30
2.50

2.60
1.30
8.40
1.90

12

0.90

2.70

111
283
131
336
104
204
83

8.90
22.6
10.5
26.8
8.30
16.3
6.60

5.0
27.2
11.1
26.5
7.50
14.1
8.70

1033
219

82.5
17.5

80.8
19.2
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Weighted %
Mean(SD)

Table 3. Cross-Tabulation of Color-Blind at Wave II by Color-Blind at Wave I

Color-Blind Wave II

Color-Blind Wave I
Agree Neutral

Disagree Total

Agree

64.60% 44.00%

36.20%

49.40%

Neutral

12.80% 29.80%

15.70%

17.70%

Disagree

22.50% 26.20%

48.10%

32.90%

Total

n=506
(100%)

n=470
(100%)

n=1,252

χ=144.36, Sig.:000, df=4
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n=276
(100%)

Table 4: Odds Ratios of Ordinal Logistic Regression of Color-Blind Racism on Race, Religion, Education, Geographic Region and Political
Ideology
Variable
Race (ref. =White)
Black
Hispanic
Other Race
Gender (ref.=female)
Male
Age
Religion (ref.=Unaffiliated)
Black Protestant
Evangelical Protestant
Mainline Protestant
Roman Catholic
Other Faith
Other Protestant
Education (ref.=Less than High School)
High School/GRE
Associates/Vocational
Bachelors
Post Graduate
Other Education
Color-Blind W1(ref.=Agree)
Color-Blind W1 - Disagree
Color-Blind W1 - Neutral
Geographic Region (ref.=South)
Northeast
Midwest
West
Political Ideology (ref.=Conservative)
Liberal
Middle of the Road
No thought to politics

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

2.86***(.24)
1.56*(.20)
1.06(.24)

2.93***(.24)
1.50*(.20)
1.09(.24)

2.91***(.24)
1.55*(.20)
1.19(.24)

2.61***(.24)
1.35(.21)
1.08(.25)

2.98***(.24)
1.59*(.20)
1.19(.24)

2.86***(.25)
1.36(.21)
1.07(.25)

0.98 (.12)
.00(.00)

0.97(.12)
.00(.00)

0.99(.12)
.00(.00)

0.97(.12)
.00(.00)

1(.12)
.00(.00)

0.97(.12)
.00(.00)

0.84(.36)
0.59**(.19)
0.97(.23)
0.69(.20)
0.78(.26)
1.01(.25)

0.87(.36)
0.64*(.19)
1(.23)
0.71(.20)
0.74(.26)
1.01(.25)

0.87(.36)
0.62*(.20)
1.02(.23)
0.71(.20)
0.8(.26)
1.01(.25)

0.80(.36)
0.59**(.19)
0.96(.23)
0.67*(.20)
0.76(.26)
1.03(.25)

0.85(.36)
0.60**(.19)
0.99(.23)
0.69(.20)
0.77(.26)
1.01(.25)

0.88(.37)
0.67*(.20)
1.05(.24)
0.72(.20)
0.73(.26)
1.04(.25)

1.06(.22)
1.24(.24)
1.81*(.25)
2.95***(.28)
1.77(.39)

1.1(.22)
1.27(.25)
1.81*(.25)
3.04***(.28)
1.84(.39)

1.01(.22)
1.17(.25)
1.66(.26)
2.60**(.28)
1.68(.40)

1.05(.22)
1.23(.24)
1.80*(.25)
2.91***(.28)
1.78(.39)

1.02(.22)
1.19(.25)
1.71*(.25)
2.81***(.28)
1.69(.39)

0.99(.23)
1.14(.25)
1.58(.26)
2.55**(.29)
1.68(.40)

3.43***(.14)
2.62***(.15)

3.27***(.14)
2.54***(.15)

3.34***(.14)
2.67***(.15)

3.43***(.14)
2.59***(.15)

3.33***(.14)
2.55***(.15)

3.10***(.14)
2.49***(.15)

1.26(.18)
0.86(.16)
1.3(.16)

1.25(.18)
0.86(.16)
1.27(.16)
1.32(.17)
0.95(.17)
0.90(.17)
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1.34(.17)
0.96(.17)
0.92(.17)

Racial Identity (ref.=Daily aware)
Racial Awareness - Infrequent)
Racial Awareness - Never)
Legal Segregation (ref.=Agree)
Legal Segregation - Neutral
Legal Segregation – Disagree
Nagelkerke R-Square
Cox and Snell R-Square
Chi-Square
df

0.74*(.16)
0.79(.16)

0.77(.16)
0.80(.16)

1.59*(.19)
1.51*(.17)

1.62*(.20)
1.48*(.18)

0.168

0.175

0.173

0.172

0.174

0.187

0.145
194.68
19

0.150
202.384
22

0.149
200.23
22

0.148
198.57
21

0.150
201.37
21

0.161
217.66
29
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